Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34172522›Full record

ArticleJournal of medical ethics2021

Epistemic injustice, children and mental illness.

Edward Harcourt

Abstract read
PubMed Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of medical ethics, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Testimonial injustice in the treatment of children's testimonies: inconsiderate and unjust cases.Zeitschrift fur Ethik und Moralphilosophie = Journal for ethics and moral philosophy · 2025
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Epistemic Injustice and Nonmaleficence.Journal of bioethical inquiry · 2023
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Article
  10. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Edward HarcourtFaculty of Philosophy, Humanities Division, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK edward.harcourt@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.ORCID 0000-0002-7176-226X

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool with which to try to theorise what goes wrong when mental health service users are not listened to by clinicians, and what goes right when they are. Is the tool adequate to the task? It is argued that, to be applicable at all, the concept needs some adjustment so that being disbelieved as a result of prejudice is one of a family of alternative necessary conditions for its application, rather than a necessary condition all on its own. It is then argued that even once adjusted in this way, the concept does not fit well in the area where the biggest efforts have been made to apply it so far, namely the highly sensitive case of adult patients suffering from delusions. Indeed it does not serve the interests of service users struggling for recognition to try to apply it in this context, because there is so much more to being listened to than simply being believed. However, the concept is found to apply smoothly in many cases where the service users are children, for example, in relation to children's testimony on the efficacy of treatment. It is suggested that further research would demonstrate the usefulness of the concept in adult cases of a similar kind.

Indexed as

Mental DisordersMental Health ServicesChildHumansPrejudicechildrenconcept of mental healthethicsmoral psychologypsychiatry

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.