Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34118394›Full record

ArticleNeuroImage2021

The representational structure of mental states generalizes across target people and stimulus modalities.

Miriam E Weaverdyck, Mark A Thornton, Diana I Tamir

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in NeuroImage, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
0.7field-weighted citation impact, top 34% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed, 7 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Miriam E WeaverdyckDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, United States. Electronic address: mweaverdyck@ucla.edu.
Mark A ThorntonDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, United States.
Diana I TamirDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, United States; Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, United States.
Princeton University · US

Funding

The structure and dynamics of mental state representationsR01MH114904 · NIMH · PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · PI TAMIR, DIANA · 2017 to 2021
$1.8M
NIMH NIH HHS R01 MH114904
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers can accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person's anger? Is reading about someone's anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. Together, these results suggest that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.

Indexed as

Social CognitionAdolescentAdultBrainEmotionsFemaleHumansImage Processing, Computer-AssistedMagnetic Resonance ImagingMaleTheory of MindYoung AdultfMRIMentalizingRepresentational similarity analysisSocial cognition

Identifiers

PMID34118394
PMCPMC8327621
OpenAlexW3168993962

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.