ArticleNature communications2021
Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation.
Article in Nature communications, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 18 papers.
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Who cites it
18 citing papers in PubMed, 34 citations in OpenAlex.
- Exact conditions for evolutionary stability in indirect reciprocity under noise.PLoS computational biology · 2025Article
- Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Article
- Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Evidence of direct and indirect reciprocity in network-structured economic games.Communications psychology · 2024Article
- A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Indirect reciprocity with Bayesian reasoning and biases.PLoS computational biology · 2024Article
- Can institutions foster cooperation by wealth redistribution?Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- When do stereotypes undermine indirect reciprocity?PLoS computational biology · 2024Article
- Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information.Nature communications · 2023Article
- Indirect reciprocity with stochastic and dual reputation updates.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Evolution of norms for judging social behavior.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information.Nature communications · 2023Article
- Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022Article
- The evolution of moral rules in a model of indirect reciprocity with private assessment.Scientific reports · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
- Erratum issued
Authors and funding
3 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Humans typically consider altruism a moral good and condition their social behavior on the moral reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and reputations support cooperation: individuals cooperate with others who are considered good. Indirect reciprocity works when an institution monitors and publicly broadcasts moral reputations. Here we develop a theory of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the reputations of their peers. Using a mathematical model, we show that adherence to an institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under four different social norms, including norms that previous studies found to perform poorly. We determine how an institution's size and its degree of tolerance towards anti-social behavior affect the rate of cooperation. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations, which increases cooperation and payoffs, so that adherence evolves by social contagion and remains robust against displacement.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.