Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34084544›Full record

ArticleRoyal Society open science2021

Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games.

Masahiko Ueda

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Royal Society open science, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  2. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  3. Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Masahiko UedaGraduate School of Sciences and Technology for Innovation, Yamaguchi University, Yamaguchi 753-8511, Japan.ORCID 0000-0002-8168-0102

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Repeated games have provided an explanation of how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favourable in a one-shot game in the Prisoner's Dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have substantially been investigated in evolutionary game theory. The original memory-one ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relationships between average pay-offs of players. Here, we extend the concept of ZD strategies to memory-two strategies in repeated games. Memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relationships between correlation functions of pay-offs and pay-offs of the previous round. Examples of memory-two ZD strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game are provided, some of which generalize the tit-for-tat strategy to a memory-two case. Extension of ZD strategies to memory-

Indexed as

memory-n strategiesRepeated gameszero-determinant strategies

Identifiers

PMID34084544
PMCPMC8150048

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.