Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34081135›Full record

ArticleJAMA network open2021

COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing in the US, 2020.

R Ryan Lash, Patrick K Moonan, Brittany L Byers, Robert A Bonacci, Kimberly E Bonner, Matthew Donahue, Catherine V Donovan, Heather N Grome, Julia M Janssen, Reed Magleby and 20 more

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in JAMA network open, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 65 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
65citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
8.3field-weighted citation impact, top 2% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

65 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 101 citations in OpenAlex.

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5 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

30 authors at 8 institutions in 1 country.

R Ryan LashEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Patrick K MoonanCOVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Brittany L ByersCOVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Robert A BonacciEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Kimberly E BonnerEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Matthew DonahueEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Catherine V DonovanEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Heather N GromeEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Julia M JanssenEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Reed MaglebyEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Heather P McLaughlinCOVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
James S MillerEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Caroline Q PrattEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Jonathan SteinbergEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Kate VarelaEpidemic Intelligence Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Greta L AnschuetzNew Jersey Department of Health, Trenton.
Paul R CieslakPublic Health Division, Oregon Health Authority, Portland.
Veronica FialkowskiVermont Department of Health, Burlington.
Aaron T FleischauerNorth Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Raleigh.
Clay GoddardSpringfield-Greene County Health Department, Springfield, Missouri.
Sara Jo JohnsonSouth Dakota State Health Department, Sioux Falls.
Michelle MorrisPolk County Health Center, Des Moines, Iowa.
Jill MosesChinle Indian Health Service Unit, Chinle, Arizona.
Allison NewmanNebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Lincoln.
Lauren PrinzingVermont Department of Health, Burlington.
Alana C SulkaGwinnett, Newton, Rockdale Counties Health Departments, Lawrenceville, Georgia.
Puthiery VaChinle Indian Health Service Unit, Chinle, Arizona.
Matthew WillisMarin County Public Health, San Rafael, California.
John E OeltmannCOVID-19 Response Team, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Assessment Team
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention · USIndian Health Service · USVermont Department of Health · USMarin Health and Human Services · USNebraska Department of Health and Human Services · USNew Jersey Department of Health · USOregon Health Authority · USWashington State Department of Health · US

Funding

Medical Research Council MR/S003940/1
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Importance: Contact tracing is a multistep process to limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Gaps in the process result in missed opportunities to prevent COVID-19. Objective: To quantify proportions of cases and their contacts reached by public health authorities and the amount of time needed to reach them and to compare the risk of a positive COVID-19 test result between contacts and the general public during 4-week assessment periods. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study took place at 13 health departments and 1 Indian Health Service Unit in 11 states and 1 tribal nation. Participants included all individuals with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 and their named contacts. Local COVID-19 surveillance data were used to determine the numbers of persons reported to have laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 who were interviewed and named contacts between June and October 2020. Main Outcomes and Measures: For contacts, the numbers who were identified, notified of their exposure, and agreed to monitoring were calculated. The median time from index case specimen collection to contact notification was calculated, as were numbers of named contacts subsequently notified of their exposure and monitored. The prevalence of a positive SARS-CoV-2 test among named and tested contacts was compared with that jurisdiction's general population during the same 4 weeks. Results: The total number of cases reported was 74 185. Of these, 43 931 (59%) were interviewed, and 24 705 (33%) named any contacts. Among the 74 839 named contacts, 53 314 (71%) were notified of their exposure, and 34 345 (46%) agreed to monitoring. A mean of 0.7 contacts were reached by telephone by public health authorities, and only 0.5 contacts per case were monitored. In general, health departments reporting large case counts during the assessment (≥5000) conducted smaller proportions of case interviews and contact notifications. In 9 locations, the median time from specimen collection to contact notification was 6 days or less. In 6 of 8 locations with population comparison data, positive test prevalence was higher among named contacts than the general population. Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study of US local COVID-19 surveillance data, testing named contacts was a high-yield activity for case finding. However, this assessment suggests that contact tracing had suboptimal impact on SARS-CoV-2 transmission, largely because 2 of 3 cases were either not reached for interview or named no contacts when interviewed. These findings are relevant to decisions regarding the allocation of public health resources among the various prevention strategies and for the prioritization of case investigations and contact tracing efforts.

Indexed as

Contact TracingPublic HealthCost-Benefit AnalysisCOVID-19COVID-19 TestingCross-Sectional StudiesDisclosureHealth Services, IndigenousHumansIncidencePrevalenceSARS-CoV-2TelephoneUnited States

Identifiers

PMID34081135
PMCPMC8176334
OpenAlexW3164553610

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.