ArticleFrontiers in behavioral neuroscience2021
Neural Design Principles for Subjective Experience: Implications for Insects.
Article in Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.
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Who cites it
7 citing papers in PubMed.
- Mapping EEG Metrics to Human Affective and Cognitive Models: An Interdisciplinary Scoping Review from a Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Biomimetics (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025Review
- Multiple mechanisms of action for an extremely painful venom.Current biology : CB · 2025Article
- Defending and refining the BirchAnimal welfare (South Mimms, England) · 2025Review
- Multiple mechanisms of action of an extremely painful venom.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2024Article
- Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain.Animal cognition · 2023Article
- Entomology beyond research and education: 2022 student debates.Journal of insect science (Online) · 2023Article
- A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience.Frontiers in systems neuroscience · 2022Article
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
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Abstract
How subjective experience is realized in nervous systems remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. An answer to this question should resolve debate about which animals are capable of subjective experience. We contend that subjective experience of sensory stimuli is dependent on the brain's awareness of its internal neural processing of these stimuli. This premise is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that disruption to either processing streams or awareness states perturb subjective experience. Given that the brain must predict the nature of sensory stimuli, we reason that conscious awareness is itself dependent on predictions generated by hierarchically organized forward models of the organism's internal sensory processing. The operation of these forward models requires a specialized neural architecture and hence any nervous system lacking this architecture is unable to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. This approach removes difficulties associated with extrapolations from behavioral and brain homologies typically employed in addressing whether an animal can feel. Using nociception as a model sensation, we show here that the
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