Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34021334›Full record

ArticleHealth policy and planning2021

Supply-side factors influencing informal payment for healthcare services in Tanzania.

Peter Binyaruka, Dina Balabanova, Martin McKee, Eleanor Hutchinson, Antonio Andreoni, Mary Ramesh, Blake Angell, Ntuli A Kapologwe, Masuma Mamdani

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health policy and planning, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Peter BinyarukaDepartment of Health System, Impact Evaluation and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box 78373, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.ORCID 0000-0002-1892-7985
Dina BalabanovaDepartment of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK.
Martin McKeeDepartment of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-0121-9683
Eleanor HutchinsonDepartment of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK.
Antonio AndreoniUCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, 11 Montague Street, London WC1B 5BP, UK.
Mary RameshDepartment of Health System, Impact Evaluation and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box 78373, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Blake AngellThe George Institute for Global Health, University of New South Wales Sydney, Sydney, Australia.ORCID 0000-0002-7188-7740
Ntuli A KapologwePresident's Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG), Dodoma, Tanzania.ORCID 0000-0003-0900-2937
Masuma MamdaniDepartment of Health System, Impact Evaluation and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box 78373, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Funding

UK Government P07073
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Informal payments for healthcare are widespread in sub-Saharan Africa. They are often regressive, potentially limiting access to quality healthcare, particularly for the most vulnerable, and can have catastrophic consequences for households. Yet there is little empirical research that uses theory-driven hypotheses to explore what influences informal payments and, especially, from health workers' perspectives. Consequently, we have explored the characteristics of health workers and facilities influencing informal payments in Tanzania, examining two hypotheses: health workers with power and position in the system are more likely to receive informal payments, and transparency and accountability measures can be bypassed by those who can game the system. We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 432 health workers from 42 public health facilities (hospitals and health centres) in 12 district councils from Pwani and Dar es Salam regions in Tanzania. Our dependent variable was whether the health worker has ever asked for or been given informal payments or bribes, while explanatory variables were measured at the individual and facility level. Given the hierarchical structure of the data, we used a multilevel mixed-effect logistic regression to explore the determinants. Twenty-seven percent of 432 health workers ever engaged in informal payment. This was more common amongst younger (<35 years) health workers and those higher in the hierarchy (specialists and heads of departments). Those receiving entitlements and benefits in a timely manner and who were subject to continued supervision were significantly less likely to receive informal payments. The likelihood of engaging in informal payments varied among health workers, consistent with our first hypothesis, but evidence on the second hypothesis remains mixed. Thus, policy responses should address both individual and system-level factors, including ensuring adequate and progressive health sector financing, better and timely remuneration of frontline public health providers, and enhanced governance and supervision.

Indexed as

Financing, PersonalHealth ServicesCross-Sectional StudiesHealth Services AccessibilityHumansTanzaniacorruptionhealth financinghealth providersInformal paymentTanzania

Identifiers

PMID34021334
PMCPMC8359751

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.