ArticleAmerican economic journal. Economic policy2019
Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges.
Article in American economic journal. Economic policy, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers.
What it found
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The trial behind it
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Who cites it
25 citing papers in PubMed.
- Does Health-Based Prospective Risk Adjustment Adequately Compensate for Individuals Diagnosed With a New Chronic Disease?Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2026Article
- Trends in prescription drug coverage restrictions in Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial insurance plans, 2011-2019.Health affairs scholar · 2026Article
- Medicare Part D Protected-Class Policy Is Associated With Lower Drug Rebates.Health affairs (Project Hope) · 2024Article
- Adverse selection and network design under regulated plan prices: Evidence from Medicaid.Journal of health economics · 2024Article
- Risk adjustment for regional healthcare funding allocations with ensemble methods: an empirical study and interpretation.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024Article
- A framework for ex-ante evaluation of the potential effects of risk equalization and risk sharing in health insurance markets with regulated competition.Health economics review · 2024Review
- Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual Framework and International Comparison.Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2024Review
- High-risk pooling for mitigating risk selection incentives in health insurance markets with sophisticated risk equalization: an application based on health survey information.BMC health services research · 2024Article
- Public and Private Options in Practice: The Military Health System.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2023Article
- Plan Selection, Enrollee Risk, and Health Spending on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Individual Marketplaces, 2019.JAMA network open · 2023Article
- The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets.The review of economics and statistics · 2023Article
- Association of Funding Cuts to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Navigator Program With Privately Sponsored Television Advertising.JAMA network open · 2022Article
- How to deal with persistently low/high spenders in health plan payment systems?Health economics · 2022Article
- Improving the Performance of Risk Adjustment Systems: Constrained Regressions, Reinsurance, and Variable Selection.American journal of health economics · 2021Article
- Fair regression for health care spending.Biometrics · 2020Article
- Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2020Article
- Upcoding: Evidence from Medicare on Squishy Risk Adjustment.The journal of political economy · 2020Article
- Data transformations to improve the performance of health plan payment methods.Journal of health economics · 2019Article
- Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2019Article
- The Comparative Advantage of Medicare Advantage.American journal of health economics · 2019Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
We study insurers' use of prescription drug formularies to screen consumers in the ACA Health Insurance exchanges. We begin by showing that exchange risk adjustment and reinsurance succeed in neutralizing selection incentives for most, but not all, consumer types. A minority of consumers, identifiable by demand for particular classes of prescription drugs, are predictably unprofitable. We then show that contract features relating to these drugs are distorted in a manner consistent with multidimensional screening. The empirical findings support a long theoretical literature examining how insurance contracts offered in equilibrium can fail to optimally trade off risk protection and moral hazard.
Identifiers
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.