Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33986519›Full record

ArticleNature human behaviour2021

A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity.

Laura Schmid, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Christian Hilbe, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
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In one paragraph

Article in Nature human behaviour, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 40 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
40citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

40 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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  4. Promoters of cooperation in evolutionary games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
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  10. Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  16. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Laura SchmidIST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria. laura.schmid@ist.ac.at.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6978-7329
Krishnendu ChatterjeeIST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria.
Christian Hilbe *Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Ploen, Germany.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5116-955X
Martin A Nowak *Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5489-0908

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known 'generous tit-for-tat' strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call 'generous scoring'. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorSocial AdjustmentSocial LearningGame TheoryHumansInterpersonal RelationsModels, PsychologicalOperations ResearchSocial EnvironmentSocial Interaction

Identifiers

PMID33986519

What OpenQuestion holds

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.