Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33962838›Full record

ArticleVaccine2023

The impact of disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on global polio eradication.

Dominika A Kalkowska, Arend Voorman, Mark A Pallansch, Steven G F Wassilak, Stephen L Cochi, Kamran Badizadegan, Kimberly M Thompson

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Vaccine, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
27citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
5.0field-weighted citation impact, top 4% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

27 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 40 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Review
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2024
    Article
  10. Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2024
    Review
  11. Review
  12. Review
  13. Article
  14. Review
  15. Article
  16. Modeling scenarios for ending poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2023
    Article
  17. Review
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Dominika A KalkowskaKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA.
Arend VoormanBill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, WA, USA.
Mark A PallanschNational Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Steven G F WassilakGlobal Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Stephen L CochiGlobal Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Kamran BadizadeganKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA.
Kimberly M ThompsonKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA. Electronic address: kimt@kidrisk.org.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention · USBill & Melinda Gates Foundation · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to substantial disruptions in global activities. The disruptions also included intentional and unintentional reductions in health services, including immunization campaigns against the transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) and persistent serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2). Building on a recently updated global poliovirus transmission and Sabin-strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) evolution model, we explored the implications of immunization disruption and restrictions of human interactions (i.e., population mixing) on the expected incidence of polio and on the resulting challenges faced by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). We demonstrate that with some resumption of activities in the fall of 2020 to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and full resumption on January 1, 2021 of all polio immunization activities to pre-COVID-19 levels, the GPEI could largely mitigate the impact of COVID-19 to the delays incurred. The relative importance of reduced mixing (leading to potentially decreased incidence) and reduced immunization (leading to potentially increased expected incidence) depends on the timing of the effects. Following resumption of immunization activities, the GPEI will likely face similar barriers to eradication of WPV and elimination of cVDPV2 as before COVID-19. The disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic may further delay polio eradication due to indirect effects on vaccine and financial resources.

Indexed as

COVID-19PoliomyelitisPoliovirusDisease EradicationDisease OutbreaksGlobal HealthHumansPandemicsPoliovirus Vaccine, OralPoliovirus Vaccine, OralCOVID-19 pandemicDynamic modelingPolio

Identifiers

PMID33962838
PMCPMC10045205
OpenAlexW3158094855

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.