Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33897047›Full record

ArticleThe Linacre quarterly2021

Double Effect Donation.

Charles C Camosy, Joseph Vukov

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The Linacre quarterly, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Double-Effect Donation Disputed.The Linacre quarterly · 2022
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Charles C CamosyFordham University, New York, NY, USA.
Joseph VukovDepartment of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, IL, USA.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0117-4232

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one's own death but rather at saving the lives of others and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one's death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life. SUMMARY: Recent cases and discussion have raised questions about whether brain death criteria successfully capture natural death. These questions are especially troubling since vital organs are often retrieved from individuals declared dead by brain death criteria. We therefore seem to be left with a choice: either salvage brain death criteria or else abandon current organ donation practices. In this article, we present a different way forward. In particular, we defend a view we call Double Effect Donation, according to which it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. Double Effect Donation, we argue, is not merely compatible with but grows out of a view that acknowledges the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life.

Indexed as

Action theoryBrain deathEuthanasiaOrgan donationPrinciple of double effect

Identifiers

PMID33897047
PMCPMC8033499

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.