Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33895904›Full record

ArticleThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care2021

Using fees to reduce bed-blocking: a game between hospitals and long-term care providers.

Snorre Kverndokk, Hans Olav Melberg

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Article in The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Contracting with sequential care providers.Health economics review · 2024
    Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Snorre KverndokkThe Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadallèen 21, 0349, Oslo, Norway. snorre.kverndokk@frisch.uio.no.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8745-9302
Hans Olav MelbergInstitute of Health and Society, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In several countries, a fee has been introduced to reduce bed-blocking in hospitals. This paper studies the implications of this fee for the strategic decisions of the hospitals and the long-term care providers. We introduce a Stackelberg game where the hospital is the leader and the care provider the follower. The policy reduces the treatment time at the hospital but does not necessarily lead to less bed-blocking, as this depends on the treatment time and bed-blocking before the reform. We test the results with data from the Norwegian Coordination Reform introduced in 2012 and find that this reform led to a large reduction in bed-blocking. The direct effect was even larger than a naïve comparison would suggest because hospitals began to report patients as ready to be discharged earlier than before the reform. Confronted with the theoretical predictions, this would mean that hospital services in average were set relatively close to the minimum levels before the reform.

Indexed as

HospitalsLong-Term CareFees and ChargesHealth Care ReformHumansNorwayPatient DischargeBed-blockingCare servicesHealth reformHospital servicesStackelberg game

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.