Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33857303›Full record

ArticleClinical infectious diseases : an official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America2021

Viral Sequencing to Investigate Sources of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in US Healthcare Personnel.

Katarina M Braun, Gage K Moreno, Ashley Buys, Elizabeth D Somsen, Max Bobholz, Molly A Accola, Laura Anderson, William M Rehrauer, David A Baker, Nasia Safdar and 3 more

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Clinical infectious diseases : an official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 30 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
30citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
3.3field-weighted citation impact, top 6% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

30 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 56 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Association between social activities and risk of COVID-19 in a cohort of healthcare personnel.Antimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE · 2025
    Article
  6. Article
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  8. SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity among healthcare professionals in a rural state.Antimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE · 2024
    Article
  9. COVID-19 outbreak and genomic investigation in an inpatient behavioral health unit.Antimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE · 2024
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Considerations for de-escalating universal masking in healthcare centers.Antimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE · 2023
    Review
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

13 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Katarina M BraunDepartment of Pathobiological Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-3612-9319
Gage K MorenoDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Ashley BuysUniversity of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Elizabeth D SomsenDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Max BobholzDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Molly A AccolaUniversity of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Laura AndersonUniversity of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
William M RehrauerUniversity of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
David A BakerDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Nasia SafdarDepartment of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Alexander J LepakDepartment of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
David H O'ConnorDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
Thomas C FriedrichDepartment of Pathobiological Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
University of Wisconsin–Madison · US

Funding

Research Training for Computation and Informatics in Biology and MedicineT15LM007359 · NLM · UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON · PI Mark W. Craven, Colin Noel Dewey · 2002 to 2026
$22.6M
INTEGRATED TRAINING FOR PHYSICIAN-SCIENTISTST32GM008692 · NIGMS · UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON · PI BURKARD, MARK E · 1998 to 2020
$10.3M
Modelling applications and systems engineering to reduce infections_the MASTERI study.DP2AI144244 · NIAID · UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON · PI SAFDAR, NASIA · 2018 to 2018
$2.3M
Defining the role of genetic drift in within-host influenza evolutionF30AI145182 · NIAID · UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON · PI BRAUN, KATARINA M · 2020 to 2022
$95k
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 1DP2AI144244-01NIAID NIH HHS DP2 AI144244NIAID NIH HHS F30 AI145182NIGMS NIH HHS T32 GM008692NLM NIH HHS T15 LM007359
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundHealthcare personnel (HCP) are at increased risk of infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We posit that current infection control guidelines generally protect HCP from SARS-CoV-2 infection in a healthcare setting.

methodsIn this retrospective case series, we used viral genomics to investigate the likely source of SARS-CoV-2 infection in HCP at a major academic medical institution in the Upper Midwest of the United States between 25 March and 27 December 2020. We obtained limited epidemiological data through informal interviews and review of the electronic health record and combined this information with healthcare-associated viral sequences and viral sequences collected in the broader community to infer the most likely source of infection in HCP.

resultsWe investigated SARS-CoV-2 infection clusters involving 95 HCP and 137 possible patient contact sequences. The majority of HCP infections could not be linked to a patient or coworker (55 of 95 [57.9%]) and were genetically similar to viruses circulating concurrently in the community. We found that 10.5% of HCP infections (10 of 95) could be traced to a coworker. Strikingly, only 4.2% (4 of 95) could be traced to a patient source.

conclusionsInfections among HCP add further strain to the healthcare system and put patients, HCP, and communities at risk. We found no evidence for healthcare-associated transmission in the majority of HCP infections evaluated. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of cryptic healthcare-associated transmission, it appears that HCP most commonly become infected with SARS-CoV-2 via community exposure. This emphasizes the ongoing importance of mask wearing, physical distancing, robust testing programs, and rapid distribution of vaccines.

Indexed as

COVID-19SARS-CoV-2Delivery of Health CareHealth PersonnelHumansRetrospective StudiesUnited Stateshealthcare personnelinfection controlprecision epidemiologySARS-CoV-2viral sequencing

Identifiers

PMID33857303
PMCPMC8083259
OpenAlexW3152691692

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.