Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33852605›Full record

ArticlePloS one2021

Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games.

Jakob Hackel, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, Akira Goto, Alfred Taudes

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In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

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3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

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4 · The record

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Jakob HackelResearch Institute for Cryptoeconomics, University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-4192-9882
Hitoshi YamamotoResearch Institute for Cryptoeconomics, University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria.ORCID 0000-0001-7966-2629
Isamu OkadaResearch Institute for Cryptoeconomics, University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-9943-2668
Akira GotoSchool of Information and Communication, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan.
Alfred TaudesResearch Institute for Cryptoeconomics, University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players' real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorEconomics, BehavioralGames, ExperimentalAdultDecision MakingFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedReward

Identifiers

PMID33852605
PMCPMC8046186

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.