Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33852119›Full record

ArticleEnvironmental science and pollution research international2021

Dynamic reward and penalty strategies of green building construction incentive: an evolutionary game theory-based analysis.

Qingfeng Meng, Yingying Liu, Zhen Li, Changzhi Wu

Abstract read
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In one paragraph

Article in Environmental science and pollution research international, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Assessing environmental impacts through innovative solutions.Environmental science and pollution research international · 2022
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Green construction practices: ensuring client satisfaction through health and safety performance.Environmental science and pollution research international · 2022
    Article
  9. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Qingfeng MengSchool of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, China.
Yingying LiuSchool of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, China.
Zhen LiSchool of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, China.
Changzhi WuSchool of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, 510006, China. changzhiwu@gzhu.edu.cn.

Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China 71671078National Natural Science Foundation of China 71971100National Natural Science Foundation of China 72071096National Natural Science Foundation of China 72071097
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Green building incentives are widely adopted in the world to promote green building construction. However, the incentives from the government are usually predetermined, which cannot obtain a stable effect in green construction practice. To better promote green building construction, this paper studies dynamic government's reward and penalty evolution during the construction process. Based on the prospect theory, the decision of government reward and penalty is formulated as evolutionary game model under four different scenarios: static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, and dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. Through theoretical analysis, our results revealed that the dynamic reward and static penalty is the best strategy to promote green building construction. More specifically, if the intensity of subsidy and penalty increases, contractors tend to green construction; while the probability of active supervision by government is inversely proportional to subsidy and positively proportional to penalty. This study can provide a useful insight for the policy makers to formulate effective reward and penalty policy, thereby standardizing the behavior of contractors, and reducing the negative impact of the construction industry on the environment.

Indexed as

Construction IndustryGame TheoryGovernmentMotivationRewardEvolutionary gameGreen building construction; Dynamic reward and penaltyProspect theory

Identifiers

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.