Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33821050›Full record

ArticleSouthern economic journal2021

Externality and COVID-19.

Peter T Leeson, Louis Rouanet

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Southern economic journal, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Rights redistribution and COVID-19 lockdown policy.European journal of law and economics · 2022
    Article
  8. On Coase and COVID-19.European journal of law and economics · 2022
    Article
  9. Optimal lockdowns.Public choice · 2022
    Article
  10. The political economy of the COVID-19 pandemic.Southern economic journal · 2021
    Article
  11. Externality and COVID-19.Southern economic journal · 2021
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Peter T LeesonDepartment of Economics George Mason University Fairfax Virginia USA.
Louis RouanetDepartment of Economics George Mason University Fairfax Virginia USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Negative infectious disease externalities are less prevalent in the absence of government intervention and less costly to society than is often supposed. That is so for three reasons. (1) Unlike externality-creating behaviors in many classical externality contexts, such behaviors are often self-limiting in the context of infectious disease. (2) In market economies, behaviors that may create infectious disease externalities typically occur at sites that are owned privately and visited voluntarily. Owners have powerful incentives to regulate such behaviors at their sites, and visitors face residual infection risk contractually. (3) The social cost of infectious disease externalities is limited by the cheapest method of avoiding externalized infection risk. That cost is modest compared to the one usually imagined: the value of life (or health) lost to the disease if government does not intervene. We elaborate these arguments in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Indexed as

COVID‐19externalityinfectious diseaseinterventionlockdownspandemic

Identifiers

PMID33821050
PMCPMC8014130

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.