Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33793574›Full record

ArticlePLoS computational biology2021

Individual differences in the perception of probability.

Mel W Khaw, Luminita Stevens, Michael Woodford

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS computational biology, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
1.6field-weighted citation impact, top 16% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 14 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Mel W KhawCenter for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-6601-3715
Luminita StevensDepartment of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, United States of America.
Michael WoodfordDepartment of Economics, Columbia University, New York City, New York, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0001-5485-5280
Columbia University · USDuke University · USUniversity of Maryland, College Park · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In recent studies of humans estimating non-stationary probabilities, estimates appear to be unbiased on average, across the full range of probability values to be estimated. This finding is surprising given that experiments measuring probability estimation in other contexts have often identified conservatism: individuals tend to overestimate low probability events and underestimate high probability events. In other contexts, repulsive biases have also been documented, with individuals producing judgments that tend toward extreme values instead. Using extensive data from a probability estimation task that produces unbiased performance on average, we find substantial biases at the individual level; we document the coexistence of both conservative and repulsive biases in the same experimental context. Individual biases persist despite extensive experience with the task, and are also correlated with other behavioral differences, such as individual variation in response speed and adjustment rates. We conclude that the rich computational demands of our task give rise to a variety of behavioral patterns, and that the apparent unbiasedness of the pooled data is an artifact of the aggregation of heterogeneous biases.

Indexed as

IndividualityProbabilityBayes TheoremComputer SimulationHumansJudgmentPerception

Identifiers

PMID33793574
PMCPMC8043721
OpenAlexW3148324397

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.