ArticleEFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority2021
Monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids.
Article in EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 46 papers.
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Who cites it
46 citing papers in PubMed, 82 citations in OpenAlex.
- SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant re-emerges in US farmed mink and free-ranging white-tailed deer in 2022-2023.Nature communications · 2026Article
- Evolution of SARS-CoV-2 caused infection in farmed minks: continuous surveillance of an 11-month outbreak at the largest Latvian mink farm.Virus evolution · 2026Article
- Natural SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed minksFrontiers in veterinary science · 2026Article
- Distribution of aminopeptidase N coronavirus receptors in the respiratory and digestive tracts of domestic and wild artiodactyls and carnivores.The Journal of general virology · 2025Article
- Genetic tracing of market wildlife and viruses at the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.Cell · 2024Article
- Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures.EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority · 2024Article
- SARS-CoV-2 Outbreaks on Mink Farms-A Review of Current Knowledge on Virus Infection, Spread, Spillover, and Containment.Viruses · 2024Review
- Article
- Genetic tracing of market wildlife and viruses at the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2023Article
- A comparison of sampling and testing approaches for the surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed American mink.Journal of veterinary diagnostic investigation : official publication of the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, Inc · 2023Article
- Mathematical Modeling of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission between Minks and Humans Considering New Variants and Mink Culling.Tropical medicine and infectious disease · 2023Article
- One health surveillance strategy for coronaviruses in Italian wildlife.Epidemiology and infection · 2023Article
- SARS-CoV-2 Surveillance between 2020 and 2021 of All Mammalian Species in Two Flemish Zoos (Antwerp Zoo and Planckendael Zoo).Veterinary sciences · 2023Article
- Avian influenza overview December 2022 - March 2023.EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority · 2023Article
- SARS-CoV-2 in animals: susceptibility of animal species, risk for animal and public health, monitoring, prevention and control.EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority · 2023Article
- Hands off the Mink! Using Environmental Sampling for SARS-CoV-2 Surveillance in American Mink.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2023Article
- Evaluation of SARS-CoV-2 passive surveillance in Lithuanian mink farms, 2020-2021.Frontiers in veterinary science · 2023Article
- Lack of SARS-CoV-2 RNA evidence in the lungs from wild European polecats (European journal of wildlife research · 2023Article
- A standardized instrument quantifying risk factors associated with bi-directional transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and other zoonotic pathogens: The COVID-19 human-animal interactions survey (CHAIS).One health (Amsterdam, Netherlands) · 2022Article
- SARS-CoV-2 Monitoring on Mink Farms in Poland.Journal of veterinary research · 2022Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
15 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.