Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33544392›Full record

ArticleHealth economics2021

Divided by choice? For-profit providers, patient choice and mechanisms of patient sorting in the English National Health Service.

Walter Beckert, Elaine Kelly

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health economics, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Observational
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Do budget constraints limit access to health care? Evidence from PCI treatments in Hungary.International journal of health economics and management · 2023
    Article
  8. Article
  9. Patient preferences and choices as a reflection of trust-A cluster analysis comparing postsurgical perceptions in a private and a public hospital.Health expectations : an international journal of public participation in health care and health policy · 2022
    Article
  10. Observational
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Walter BeckertDepartment of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck University of London, London, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-8705-9547
Elaine KellyInstitute for Fiscal Studies, London, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper studies patient choice of provider following government reforms in the 2000s, which allowed for-profit surgical centers to compete with existing public National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in England. For-profit providers offer significant benefits, notably shorter waiting times. We estimate the extent to which different types of patients benefit from the reforms, and we investigate mechanisms that cause differential benefits. Our counterfactual simulations show that, in terms of the value of access, entry of for-profit providers benefitted the richest patients twice as much as the poorest, and white patients six times as much as ethnic minority patients. Half of these differences is explained by healthcare geography and patient health, while primary care referral practice plays a lesser, though non-negligible role. We also show that, with capitated reimbursement, different compositions of patient risks between for-profit surgical centers and existing public hospitals put public hospitals at a competitive disadvantage.

Indexed as

Patient PreferenceState MedicineEthnicityHospitals, PrivateHumansMinority Groupscontracting out public servicesdemand for healthcareinequalitypatient choice

Identifiers

PMID33544392
PMCPMC8248133

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.