Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33522716›Full record

ReviewJournal of neuropsychology2021

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution.

Edward H F de Haan, Huibert Steven Scholte, Yair Pinto, Nicoletta Foschi, Gabriele Polonara, Mara Fabri

Open access · hybridAbstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Journal of neuropsychology, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
1.1field-weighted citation impact, top 26% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed, 8 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.

Edward H F de HaanDepartment of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.ORCID 0000-0003-0312-3674
Huibert Steven ScholteDepartment of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Yair PintoDepartment of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Nicoletta FoschiEpilepsy Center-Neurological Clinic, Azienda "Ospedali Riuniti", Ancona, Italy.
Gabriele PolonaraDepartment of Odontostomatologic and Specialized Clinical Sciences, Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy.
Mara FabriDepartment of Experimental and Clinical Medicine, Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy.
Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences · NLMarche Polytechnic University · ITOspedali Riuniti di Ancona · IT

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one 'me' and that is the one that is conscious. This means that 'singularity' is a defining aspect of 'consciousness'. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split-brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to 'the singularity'. In this review, we will re-examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho-active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split-brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a 'Me-ness', emerges in the interaction between the world and response-planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.

Indexed as

ConsciousnessSplit-Brain ProcedureAttentionBrainHumansanosognosiaconsciousnesscovert knowledgeego dissolutionsingularity

Identifiers

PMID33522716
PMCPMC8048575
OpenAlexW3127955356

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.