Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33471806›Full record

ArticlePLoS computational biology2021

Estimating and interpreting secondary attack risk: Binomial considered biased.

Yushuf Sharker, Eben Kenah

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS computational biology, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed
2.6field-weighted citation impact, top 10% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed, 20 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. medRxiv : the preprint server for health sciences · 2026
    Article
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  9. Infection-Induced Immunity Is Associated With Protection Against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Infection and Decreased Infectivity.Clinical infectious diseases : an official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America · 2023
    Article
  10. Observational
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Yushuf SharkerDivision of Biometrics, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-9144-4875
Eben KenahBiostatistics Division, College of Public Health, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-7117-7773
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research · USThe Ohio State University · US

Funding

Understanding Transmission with Integrated Genetic and Epidemiologic InferenceU54GM111274 · NIGMS · FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RESEARCH CENTER · PI BEDFORD, TREVOR BC · 2014 to 2018
$12.5M
Regression, Phylogenetics, and Study Design in Infectious Disease EpidemiologyR01AI116770 · NIAID · UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA · PI KENAH, EBEN · 2016 to 2020
$1.8M
Semiparametric analysis of the household transmission of choleraR03AI124017 · NIAID · UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA · PI KENAH, EBEN · 2016 to 2017
$144k
NIAID NIH HHS R01 AI116770NIAID NIH HHS R03 AI124017NIGMS NIH HHS U54 GM111274
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The household secondary attack risk (SAR), often called the secondary attack rate or secondary infection risk, is the probability of infectious contact from an infectious household member A to a given household member B, where we define infectious contact to be a contact sufficient to infect B if he or she is susceptible. Estimation of the SAR is an important part of understanding and controlling the transmission of infectious diseases. In practice, it is most often estimated using binomial models such as logistic regression, which implicitly attribute all secondary infections in a household to the primary case. In the simplest case, the number of secondary infections in a household with m susceptibles and a single primary case is modeled as a binomial(m, p) random variable where p is the SAR. Although it has long been understood that transmission within households is not binomial, it is thought that multiple generations of transmission can be neglected safely when p is small. We use probability generating functions and simulations to show that this is a mistake. The proportion of susceptible household members infected can be substantially larger than the SAR even when p is small. As a result, binomial estimates of the SAR are biased upward and their confidence intervals have poor coverage probabilities even if adjusted for clustering. Accurate point and interval estimates of the SAR can be obtained using longitudinal chain binomial models or pairwise survival analysis, which account for multiple generations of transmission within households, the ongoing risk of infection from outside the household, and incomplete follow-up. We illustrate the practical implications of these results in an analysis of household surveillance data collected by the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.

Indexed as

Models, BiologicalModels, StatisticalComputational BiologyDisease Transmission, InfectiousFamily CharacteristicsHumansInfluenza, HumanPublic Health SurveillanceRisk

Identifiers

PMID33471806
PMCPMC7850487
OpenAlexW3126098117

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC0
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.