Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33439129›Full record

ArticleJMIR diabetes2021

Analysis of Diabetes Apps to Assess Privacy-Related Permissions: Systematic Search of Apps.

José Javier Flors-Sidro, Mowafa Househ, Alaa Abd-Alrazaq, Josep Vidal-Alaball, Luis Fernandez-Luque, Carlos Luis Sanchez-Bocanegra

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in JMIR diabetes, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
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  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

José Javier Flors-SidroInformation Systems Department, Consorci Hospitalari Provincial de Castelló, Castelló de la Plana, Spain.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6464-1753
Mowafa HousehDivision of Information and Computing Technology, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3648-6271
Alaa Abd-AlrazaqDivision of Information and Computing Technology, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7695-4626
Josep Vidal-AlaballHealth Promotion in Rural Areas Research Group, Gerència Territorial de la Catalunya Central, Institut Català de la Salut, Sant Fruitós de Bages, Spain.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3527-4242
Luis Fernandez-LuqueSalumedia Labs, Sevilla, Spain.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8165-9904
Carlos Luis Sanchez-BocanegraFaculty of Health Sciences, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7033-5971

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundMobile health has become a major vehicle of support for people living with diabetes. Accordingly, the availability of mobile apps for diabetes has been steadily increasing. Most of the previous reviews of diabetes apps have focused on the apps' features and their alignment with clinical guidelines. However, there is a lack of knowledge on the actual compliance of diabetes apps with privacy and data security guidelines.

objectiveThe aim of this study was to assess the levels of privacy of mobile apps for diabetes to contribute to the raising of awareness of privacy issues for app users, developers, and governmental data protection regulators.

methodsWe developed a semiautomatic app search module capable of retrieving Android apps' privacy-related information, particularly the dangerous permissions required by apps, with the aim of analyzing privacy aspects related to diabetes apps. Following the research selection criteria, the original 882 apps were narrowed down to 497 apps that were included in the analysis.

resultsApproximately 60% of the analyzed diabetes apps requested potentially dangerous permissions, which pose a significant risk to users' data privacy. In addition, 28.4% (141/497) of the apps did not provide a website for their privacy policy. Moreover, it was found that 40.0% (199/497) of the apps contained advertising, and some apps that claimed not to contain advertisements actually did. Ninety-five percent of the apps were free, and those belonging to the "medical" and "health and fitness" categories were the most popular. However, app users do not always realize that the free apps' business model is largely based on advertising and, consequently, on sharing or selling their private data, either directly or indirectly, to unknown third parties.

conclusionsThe aforementioned findings confirm the necessity of educating patients and health care providers and raising their awareness regarding the privacy aspects of diabetes apps. Therefore, this research recommends properly and comprehensively training users, ensuring that governments and regulatory bodies enforce strict data protection laws, devising much tougher security policies and protocols in Android and in the Google Play Store, and implicating and supervising all stakeholders in the apps' development process.

Indexed as

dangerous permissionsdiabetes mellitusmobile appsprivacy

Identifiers

PMID33439129
PMCPMC7840294

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.