Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33332623›Full record

ArticleBioethics2021

A conscious choice: Is it ethical to aim for unconsciousness at the end of life?

Antony Takla, Julian Savulescu, Dominic J C Wilkinson

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Bioethics, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
1.6field-weighted citation impact, top 15% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 17 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
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  7. Expanded terminal sedation in end-of-life care.Journal of medical ethics · 2023
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.

Antony TaklaFaculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia.ORCID 0000-0001-6138-5184
Julian SavulescuOxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.ORCID 0000-0003-1691-6403
Dominic J C WilkinsonOxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.ORCID 0000-0003-3958-8633
University of Oxford · GBJohn Radcliffe Hospital · GB

Funding

Wellcome Trust 104848/Z/14/ZWellcome Trust WT104848Wellcome Trust WT203132
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

One of the most commonly referenced ethical principles when it comes to the management of dying patients is the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The DDE affirms that it is acceptable to cause side effects (e.g. respiratory depression) as a consequence of symptom-focused treatment. Much discussion of the ethics of end of life care focuses on the question of whether actions (or omissions) would hasten (or cause) death, and whether that is permissible. However, there is a separate question about the permissibility of hastening or causing unconsciousness in dying patients. Some authors have argued that the DDE would not permit end of life care that directly aims to render the patient unconscious. The claim is that consciousness is an objective human good and therefore doctors should not intentionally (and permanently) suppress it. Three types of end of life care (EOLC) practices will be explored in this article. The first is symptom-based management (e.g. analgesia); the second is proportional terminal sedation as a means of relieving suffering (also referred to as palliative sedation or continuous deep sedation); and finally, deliberate and rapid sedation to unconsciousness until death (a practice we call terminal anaesthesia in this paper). After examining the common arguments for the various types of symptom-based management and sedation, we apply the DDE to the latter two types of EOLC practices. We argue that aiming at unconsciousness, contrary to some claims, can be morally good or at least morally neutral in some dying patients.

Indexed as

EuthanasiaTerminal CareConsciousnessDeathHumansPalliative CareUnconsciousnessdoctrine of double effectend of life caresedationterminal anaesthesiaterminal sedationunconsciousness

Identifiers

PMID33332623
PMCPMC8243249
OpenAlexW3096232650

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.