ArticleiScience2020
Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization.
Article in iScience, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers.
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Who cites it
25 citing papers in PubMed.
- The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric public goods games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games.PLoS computational biology · 2026Article
- How risk communication shapes individual response to climate change: an experimental study.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- Humans program artificial delegates to accurately solve collective-risk dilemmas but lack precision.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- Article
- An outside individual option increases optimism and facilitates collaboration when groups form flexibly.Nature communications · 2024Article
- Committing to the wrong artificial delegate in a collective-risk dilemma is better than directly committing mistakes.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Success-driven opinion formation determines social tensions.iScience · 2024Article
- Article
- Emotion expression and cooperation under collective risks.iScience · 2023Article
- Article
- Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Article
- EGTtools: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python.iScience · 2023Article
- Delegation to artificial agents fosters prosocial behaviors in the collective risk dilemma.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Inferring strategies from observations in long iterated Prisoner's dilemma experiments.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence.Chaos, solitons, and fractals · 2022Article
- Dynamical systems as a level of cognitive analysis of multi-agent learning: Algorithmic foundations of temporal-difference learning dynamics.Neural computing & applications · 2022Article
- Segregation and clustering of preferences erode socially beneficial coordination.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
6 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally - through a collective risk dilemma - the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.