Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33293537›Full record

ReviewNature communications2020

The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution.

Gregory Lewis, Jacob L Jordan, David A Relman, Gregory D Koblentz, Jade Leung, Allan Dafoe, Cassidy Nelson, Gerald L Epstein, Rebecca Katz, Michael Montague and 8 more

Abstract readReview
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Review in Nature communications, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

18 authors.

Gregory LewisFuture of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
Jacob L JordanNuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-4289-2583
David A RelmanDepartment of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-8331-1354
Gregory D KoblentzSchar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Washington, DC, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-0793-1209
Jade LeungFuture of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
Allan DafoeFuture of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
Cassidy NelsonFuture of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-0934-8313
Gerald L EpsteinCenter for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-7286-034X
Rebecca KatzCenter for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.
Michael MontagueCenter for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
Ethan C AlleyAlt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.
Claire Marie FiloneThe Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MA, USA.
Stephen LubyDepartment of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.
George M ChurchAlt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-3535-2076
Piers MillettFuture of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
Kevin M EsveltAlt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-8797-3945
Elizabeth E CameronNuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, USA.
Thomas V InglesbyCenter for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology.

Indexed as

Security MeasuresAnimalsBiotechnologyBioterrorismCommunicable Disease ControlCommunicable DiseasesDatasets as TopicDNAForensic GeneticsGenetic EngineeringHumansOrganisms, Genetically ModifiedVirulenceDNA

Identifiers

PMID33293537
PMCPMC7722838

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.