Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33286286›Full record

ArticleEntropy (Basel, Switzerland)2020

Fact, Fiction, and Fitness.

Chetan Prakash, Chris Fields, Donald D Hoffman, Robert Prentner, Manish Singh

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Entropy (Basel, Switzerland), 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 17 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
17citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

17 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. FurtherFrontiers in computational neuroscience · 2025
    Article
  3. Computers, meaning, and consciousness.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2025
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Interfacing consciousness.Frontiers in psychology · 2024
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Fusions of Consciousness.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Behavioral Ethics Ecologies of Human-Artificial Intelligence Systems.Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022
    Article
  12. Is Consciousness First in Virtual Reality?Frontiers in psychology · 2022
    Article
  13. Review
  14. Article
  15. Review
  16. Review
  17. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Chetan PrakashDepartment of Mathematics, California State University, San Bernardino, CA 92407, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-9931-7814
Chris FieldsIndependent Researcher, 23 rue des Lavandières, 11160 Caunes Minervois, France.ORCID 0000-0002-4812-0744
Donald D HoffmanDepartment of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA.
Robert PrentnerDepartment of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-1890-0827
Manish SinghDepartment of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick/Piscataway Campus, NJ 08854, USA.

Funding

Swiss National Science Foundation P2EZP1_175109
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

A theory of consciousness, whatever else it may do, must address the structure of experience. Our perceptual experiences are richly structured. Simply seeing a red apple, swaying between green leaves on a stout tree, involves symmetries, geometries, orders, topologies, and algebras of events. Are these structures also present in the world, fully independent of their observation? Perceptual theorists of many persuasions-from computational to radical embodied-say yes: perception veridically presents to observers structures that exist in an observer-independent world; and it does so because natural selection shapes perceptual systems to be increasingly veridical. Here we study four structures: total orders, permutation groups, cyclic groups, and measurable spaces. We ask whether the payoff functions that drive evolution by natural selection are homomorphisms of these structures. We prove, in each case, that generically the answer is no: as the number of world states and payoff values go to infinity, the probability that a payoff function is a homomorphism goes to zero. We conclude that natural selection almost surely shapes perceptions of these structures to be non-veridical. This is consistent with the interface theory of perception, which claims that natural selection shapes perceptual systems not to provide veridical perceptions, but to serve as species-specific interfaces that guide adaptive behavior. Our results present a constraint for any theory of consciousness which assumes that structure in perceptual experience is shaped by natural selection.

Indexed as

Bayesian decision theoryevolutionary game theoryevolutionary psychologyfitnessinterface theory of perceptionnatural selectionperceptionveridicality

Identifiers

PMID33286286
PMCPMC7517005

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.