Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33196907›Full record

ReviewProtoplasma2021

Debunking a myth: plant consciousness.

Jon Mallatt, Michael R Blatt, Andreas Draguhn, David G Robinson, Lincoln Taiz

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Protoplasma, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 29 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
29citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

29 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Review
  3. Article
  4. All Organisms Can Be Anesthetized, but There's No Point?BioEssays : news and reviews in molecular, cellular and developmental biology · 2025
    Review
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Review
  11. The "plant neurobiology" revolution.Plant signaling & behavior · 2024
    Review
  12. Review
  13. Review
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Editorial: Comparative animal consciousness.Frontiers in systems neuroscience · 2022
    Article
  18. Review
  19. Article
  20. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Jon MallattThe University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID, 83844, USA. jmallatt@uidaho.edu.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3502-1560
Michael R BlattLaboratory of Plant Physiology and Biophysics, Bower Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK.
Andreas DraguhnInstitute for Physiology and Pathophysiology, Medical Faculty, University of Heidelberg, 69120, Heidelberg, Germany.
David G RobinsonCentre for Organismal Studies, University of Heidelberg, 69120, Heidelberg, Germany.
Lincoln TaizDepartment of Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, 95064, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Claims that plants have conscious experiences have increased in recent years and have received wide coverage, from the popular media to scientific journals. Such claims are misleading and have the potential to misdirect funding and governmental policy decisions. After defining basic, primary consciousness, we provide new arguments against 12 core claims made by the proponents of plant consciousness. Three important new conclusions of our study are (1) plants have not been shown to perform the proactive, anticipatory behaviors associated with consciousness, but only to sense and follow stimulus trails reactively; (2) electrophysiological signaling in plants serves immediate physiological functions rather than integrative-information processing as in nervous systems of animals, giving no indication of plant consciousness; (3) the controversial claim of classical Pavlovian learning in plants, even if correct, is irrelevant because this type of learning does not require consciousness. Finally, we present our own hypothesis, based on two logical assumptions, concerning which organisms possess consciousness. Our first assumption is that affective (emotional) consciousness is marked by an advanced capacity for operant learning about rewards and punishments. Our second assumption is that image-based conscious experience is marked by demonstrably mapped representations of the external environment within the body. Certain animals fit both of these criteria, but plants fit neither. We conclude that claims for plant consciousness are highly speculative and lack sound scientific support.

Indexed as

ConsciousnessHumansPlant DevelopmentPlantsCell consciousnessClassical (Pavlovian) learningPlant and animal consciousnessPlant electrophysiologyProactive behaviorReciprocal signaling

Identifiers

PMID33196907
PMCPMC8052213

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.