Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33182846›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2020

Performance Pay in Hospitals: An Experiment on Bonus-Malus Incentives.

Nadja Kairies-Schwarz, Claudia Souček

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Looking inside the lab: a systematic literature review of economic experiments in health service provision.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024
    Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. [Current health economic and policy issues in intensive care and emergency medicine].Medizinische Klinik, Intensivmedizin und Notfallmedizin · 2025
    Review
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Measuring the State Dependence Effect in Hospital Payment Adjustment.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Nadja Kairies-SchwarzFaculty of Economics and Business Administration & CINCH-Health Economics Research Center, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45127 Essen, Germany.
Claudia SoučekFaculty of Economics and Business Administration & CINCH-Health Economics Research Center, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45127 Essen, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Recent policy reforms in Germany require the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus-malus incentives in the inpatient care sector. We conduct a controlled online experiment with real hospital physicians from public hospitals and medical students in Germany, in which we investigate the effects of introducing a performance pay component with bonus-malus incentives to a simplified version of the German Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) system using a sequential design with stylized routine cases. In both parts, participants choose between the patient optimal and profit maximizing treatment option for the same eight stylized routine cases. We find that the introduction of bonus-malus incentives only statistically significantly increases hospital physicians' proportion of patient optimal choices for cases with high monetary baseline DRG incentives to choose the profit maximizing option. Medical students behave qualitatively similar. However, they are statistically significantly less patient oriented than real hospital physicians, and statistically significantly increase their patient optimal decisions with the introduction of bonus-malus incentives in all stylized routine cases. Overall, our results indicate that whether the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus-malus incentives to the (German) DRG system has a positive effect on the quality of care or not particularly depends on the monetary incentives implemented in the DRG system as well as the type of participants and their initial level of patient orientation.

Indexed as

HospitalsMotivationPhysiciansQuality of Health CareFemaleGermanyHumansMaleStudents, Medicalartefactual field experimentbonus–malus incentivesdiagnosis related groupslaboratory experimentpay for performance

Identifiers

PMID33182846
PMCPMC7697549

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.