Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33165932›Full record

ArticleHealth services research2021

The effects of coding intensity in Medicare Advantage on plan benefits and finances.

Paul D Jacobs, Richard Kronick

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health services research, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 17 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
17citing papers in PubMed
3.7field-weighted citation impact, top 5% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

17 citing papers in PubMed, 26 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Paul D JacobsAgency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Financing, Access, and Cost Trends, Rockville, Maryland, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-1349-8886
Richard KronickHerbert Wertheim School of Public Health, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-6219-0861
Access to Wholistic and Productive Living Institute · USUniversity of California San Diego · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo assess how beneficiary premiums, expected out-of-pocket costs, and plan finances in the Medicare Advantage (MA) market are related to coding intensity. DATA SOURCES/STUDY

settingMA plan characteristics and administrative records from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the sample of beneficiaries enrolled in both MA and Part D between 2008 and 2015. Medicare claims and drug utilization data for Traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries were used to calibrate an independent measure of health risk. STUDY

designCoding intensity was measured by comparing the CMS risk score for each MA contract with a contract level risk score developed using prescription drug data. We conducted regressions of plan outcomes, estimating the relationship between outcomes and coding intensity. To develop prescription drug scores, we assigned therapeutic classes to beneficiaries based on their prescription drug utilization. We then regressed nondrug spending for TM beneficiaries in 2015 on demographic and therapeutic class identifiers for 2014 and used the coefficients to predict relative risk. PRINCIPAL

findingsWe found that, for each $1 increase in potential revenue resulting from coding intensity, MA plan bid submissions declined by $0.10 to $0.19, and another $0.21 to $0.45 went toward reducing plans' medical loss ratios, an indication of higher profitability. We found only a small impact on beneficiary's projected out-of-pocket costs in a plan, which serves as a measure of the generosity of plan benefits, and a $0.11 to $0.16 reduction in premiums. As expected, coding intensity's effect on bids was substantially larger in counties with higher levels of MA competition than in less competitive counties.

conclusionsWhile coding intensity increases taxpayers' costs of the MA program, enrollees and plans both benefit but with larger gains for plans. The adoption of policies to more completely adjust for coding intensity would likely affect both beneficiaries and plan profits.

Indexed as

Age FactorsCenters for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.Clinical CodingDiagnosis-Related GroupsDrug UtilizationEconomic CompetitionFinancing, PersonalHealth ExpendituresHealth StatusHumansInsurance Claim ReviewInsurance, Health, ReimbursementMedicare Part CMedicare Part DRisk AssessmentUnited Statesclinical codingcost sharinginsurance premiumsmanaged competitionMedicare advantage

Identifiers

PMID33165932
PMCPMC7969203
OpenAlexW3104467810

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.