ArticlePloS one2020
Testing the stability of theory of mind: A longitudinal approach.
Article in PloS one, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 24 citations in OpenAlex.
- Validation of the Cognitive-Emotional Perspective Taking test in patients with neurodegeneration.Journal of Alzheimer's disease : JAD · 2025Article
- Exploring social cognition and romantic self-efficacy in autistic young adults: Better social awareness is associated with lower confidence.Research in autism spectrum disorders · 2024Article
- Spontaneous theory of mind in autism: are anticipatory gaze and reaction time biases consistent?Frontiers in psychiatry · 2024Article
- The Origins of Theory of Mind in Infant Social Cognition: Investigating Longitudinal Pathways from Intention Understanding and Joint Attention to Preschool Theory of Mind.Journal of cognition and development : official journal of the Cognitive Development Society · 2023Article
- How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task.Frontiers in psychology · 2023Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
An explicit understanding of false belief develops around the age of four years. However, tasks based on spontaneous responses have revealed an implicit understanding of belief and other theory of mind constructs in infants in their second year of life. The few longitudinal studies that have examined conceptual continuity of theory of mind from infancy to early childhood have reported mixed findings. Here we report two longitudinal experiments to investigate the developmental relation between implicit and explicit theory of mind. No link was observed in the first experiment between false belief and intention understanding measured at 14 and 18 months with the violation of expectation paradigm and tasks measuring explicit and implicit false belief at four or five years of age. In the second experiment, infants aged 18 months were tested with a battery of tasks that measured knowledge inference and false belief. They were then tested with the theory of mind scale at five years of age. The parents completed the Children's Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ). As in the first experiment, there were no associations between early and later forms of theory of mind. We suggest that these findings do not support the view that there is conceptual continuity in theory of mind development.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.