Evidence map›Paper›PMID 33123514›Full record

SynthesisFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2020

A Systematic Review of the Criminogenic Potential of Synthetic Biology and Routes to Future Crime Prevention.

Mariam Elgabry, Darren Nesbeth, Shane D Johnson

Abstract readSystematic Review
In one paragraph

Synthesis in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Cyber-biological convergence: a systematic review and future outlook.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024
    Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Microbial genomics: a potential toolkit for forensic investigations.Forensic science, medicine, and pathology · 2025
    Review
  5. Review
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Mariam ElgabryDawes Center for Future Crime, Jill Dando Institute, Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Darren NesbethAdvanced Centre for Biochemical Engineering, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Shane D JohnsonDawes Center for Future Crime, Jill Dando Institute, Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London, London, United Kingdom.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Synthetic biology has the potential to positively transform society in many application areas, including medicine. In common with all revolutionary new technologies, synthetic biology can also enable crime. Like cybercrime, that emerged following the advent of the internet, biocrime can have a significant effect on society, but may also impact on peoples' health. For example, the scale of harm caused by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic illustrates the potential impact of future biocrime and highlights the need for prevention strategies. Systematic evidence quantifying the crime opportunities posed by synthetic biology has to date been very limited. Here, we systematically reviewed forms of crime that could be facilitated by synthetic biology with a view to informing their prevention. A total of 794 articles from four databases were extracted and a three-step screening phase resulted in 15 studies that met our threshold criterion for thematic synthesis. Within those studies, 13 exploits were identified. Of these, 46% were dependent on technologies characteristic of synthetic biology. Eight potential crime types emerged from the studies: bio-discrimination, cyber-biocrime, bio-malware, biohacking, at-home drug manufacturing, illegal gene editing, genetic blackmail, and neuro-hacking. 14 offender types were identified. For the most commonly identified offenders (>3 mentions) 40% were outsider threats. These observations suggest that synthetic biology presents substantial new offending opportunities. Moreover, that more effective engagement, such as ethical hacking, is needed now to prevent a crime harvest from developing in the future. A framework to address the synthetic biology crime landscape is proposed.

Indexed as

biocrimebiosecuritycrime harvestcrime sciencecyberbiosecuritysynthetic biologysystematic review

Identifiers

PMID33123514
PMCPMC7573185

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.