ReviewBiosafety and health2021
Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?
Review in Biosafety and health, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
10 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.
- Cyber-biological convergence: a systematic review and future outlook.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024Pooled it
- Synthetic Integration of an FCS into Coronaviruses-Hype or an Unresolved Biorisk? An Integrative Analysis of DNA Repair, Cancer Research, Drug Development, and Escape Mutant Traits.Life (Basel, Switzerland) · 2026Article
- BAKE: a novel framework for iterative security design for identifying criminally-exploitable vulnerabilities in biotechnology products.Crime science · 2025Article
- Cryptographic approaches to authenticating synthetic DNA sequences.Trends in biotechnology · 2024Review
- Recombination between coronaviruses and synthetic RNAs and biorisk implications motivated by a SARS-CoV-2 FCS origin controversy.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2023Article
- Biosafety and biosecurity challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2023Article
- Health horizons: Future trends and technologies from the European Medicines Agency's horizon scanning collaborations.Frontiers in medicine · 2022Article
- Are null segregants new combinations of heritable material and should they be regulated?Frontiers in genome editing · 2022Article
- Advances in Synthetic Biology and Biosafety Governance.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2021Review
- Assessing the Role of Cyberbiosecurity in Agriculture: A Case Study.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
As the entire world is under the grip of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and as many are eagerly trying to explain the origins of the virus and cause of the pandemic, it is imperative to place more attention on related potential biosafety risks. Biology and biotechnology have changed dramatically during the last ten years or so. Their reliance on digitization, automation, and their cyber-overlaps have created new vulnerabilities for unintended consequences and potentials for intended exploitation that are mostly under-appreciated. This study summarizes and elaborates on these new cyberbiosecurity challenges, (1) in terms of comprehending the evolving threat landscape and determining new risk potentials, (2) in developing adequate safeguarding measures, their validation and implementation, and (3) specific critical risks and consequences, many of them unique to the life-sciences. Drawing other's expertise and my previous work, this article reviews and critically interprets our current bio-economy situation. The goal is not to attribute causative aspects of past biosafety or biosecurity events, but to highlight the fact that the bioeconomy harbors unique features that have to be more critically assessed for their potential to unintentionally cause harm to human health or environment, or to be re-tasked with an intention to cause harm. It is concluded with recommendations that will need to be considered to help ensure converging and emerging biorisk challenges, in order to minimize vulnerabilities to the life-science enterprise, public health, and national security.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.