Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32993623›Full record

ArticleBMC medical informatics and decision making2020

Analyzing medical device connectivity and its effect on cyber security in german hospitals.

Markus Willing, Christian Dresen, Uwe Haverkamp, Sebastian Schinzel

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC medical informatics and decision making, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
0.5field-weighted citation impact, top 38% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 16 citations in OpenAlex.

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  7. Cyber-resilient Intensive Care Unit: Ransomware is a Patient-safety Crisis-A Resource-stratified Approach for India.Indian journal of critical care medicine : peer-reviewed, official publication of Indian Society of Critical Care Medicine
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Markus WillingUniversity of Münster, ■■■, Germany.
Christian DresenMünster University of Applied Sciences, ■■■, Germany.
Uwe HaverkampUniversity of Münster, ■■■, Germany.
Sebastian SchinzelMünster University of Applied Sciences, ■■■, Germany.
FH Münster · DEUniversity of Münster · DE

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundModern healthcare devices can be connected to computer networks and many western healthcare institutions run those devices in networks. At the same time, cyber attacks are on the rise and there is evidence that cybercriminals do not spare critical infrastructure such as major hospitals, even if they endanger patients. Intuitively, the more and closer connected healthcare devices are to public networks, the higher the risk of getting attacked.

methodsTo asses the current connectivity status of healthcare devices, we surveyed the field of German hospitals and especially University Medical Center UMCs.

resultsThe results show a strong correlation between the networking degree and the number of medical devices. The average number of medical devices is 25.150, with a median of networked medical devices of 3.600. Actual key users of networked medical devices are the departments Radiology, Intensive Care, Radio-Oncology RO, Nuclear Medicine NUC, and Anaesthesiology in the group of UMCs. In the next five years, the usage of networked medical devices will increase significantly in the departments of Surgery, Intensive Care, and Radiology. We detected a strong correlation between the degree of connectivity and the likelihood of being attacked.The survey answers regarding the cyber security status reveal a lack of security basics in some of the inquired hospitals. We did discover successful attacks in hospitals with separated or subsidiary departments. A fusion of competencies on an organizational level facilitates the right behavior here. Most hospitals rated themselves predominantly positively in the self-assessment but also stated the usefulness of IT security insurance.

conclusionsConcluding our results, hospitals are already facing the consequences of omitted measures within their growing pool of medical devices. Continuously relying on historically grown structures without adaption and trusting manufactures to solve vectors is a critical behavior that could seriously endanger patients.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityComputer Communication NetworksEquipment and SuppliesGermanyHealth FacilitiesHospitalsHumansRadiographyRadiologyRisk AssessmentSecurity MeasuresCritical infrastructureGermanyIT-securityNetworked medical devices

Identifiers

PMID32993623
PMCPMC7526356
OpenAlexW3091102633

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.