Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32929615›Full record

ArticleJournal of medical systems2020

A Genetic Attack Against Machine Learning Classifiers to Steal Biometric Actigraphy Profiles from Health Related Sensor Data.

Enrique Garcia-Ceja, Brice Morin, Anton Aguilar-Rivera, Michael Alexander Riegler

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of medical systems, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
0.6field-weighted citation impact, top 24% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 4 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 4 institutions in 2 countries.

Enrique Garcia-CejaSINTEF Digital, Oslo, Norway. enrique.garcia-ceja@sintef.no.
Brice MorinSINTEF Digital, Oslo, Norway.
Anton Aguilar-RiveraBarcelona Supercomputing Center, Barcelona, Spain.
Michael Alexander RieglerSimulaMet, Oslo, Norway.
Simula Metropolitan Center for Digital Engineering · NOSINTEF · NOSINTEF DigitalUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya · ES

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In this work, we propose the use of a genetic-algorithm-based attack against machine learning classifiers with the aim of 'stealing' users' biometric actigraphy profiles from health related sensor data. The target classification model uses daily actigraphy patterns for user identification. The biometric profiles are modeled as what we call impersonator examples which are generated based solely on the predictions' confidence score by repeatedly querying the target classifier. We conducted experiments in a black-box setting on a public dataset that contains actigraphy profiles from 55 individuals. The data consists of daily motion patterns recorded with an actigraphy device. These patterns can be used as biometric profiles to identify each individual. Our attack was able to generate examples capable of impersonating a target user with a success rate of 94.5%. Furthermore, we found that the impersonator examples have high transferability to other classifiers trained with the same training set. We also show that the generated biometric profiles have a close resemblance to the ground truth profiles which can lead to sensitive data exposure, like revealing the time of the day an individual wakes-up and goes to bed.

Indexed as

ActigraphyTheftAlgorithmsBiometryHumansMachine LearningBiometric profilesGenetic algorithmsImpersonator attackMachine learning

Identifiers

PMID32929615
PMCPMC7497442
OpenAlexW3086358271

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.