Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32897783›Full record

ArticleHealth affairs (Project Hope)2020

High Rates Of Partial Participation In The First Year Of The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System.

Nate C Apathy, Jordan Everson

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health affairs (Project Hope), 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Emergency clinician participation and performance in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System.Academic emergency medicine : official journal of the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine · 2022
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Practice and market factors associated with provider volume of health information exchange.Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA · 2021
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Nate C ApathyNate C. Apathy is a postdoctoral fellow at the Perelman School of Medicine and Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, both at the University of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time the study was conducted, he was a doctoral student in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Indiana University, in Indianapolis, Indiana.
Jordan EversonJordan Everson (jordan.everson@vanderbilt.edu) is an assistant professor in the Department of Health Policy at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, in Nashville, Tennessee.

Funding

The Indiana Training Program in Public & Population Health InformaticsT15LM012502 · NLM · INDIANA UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS · PI Brian E. Dixon, William F Fadel · 2017 to 2026
$4.7M
Learning Health System Scholar Program at VanderbiltK12HS026395 · AHRQ · VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER · PI ROTHMAN, RUSSELL L., ROUMIE, CHRISTIANNE L. · 2018 to 2022
$2.7M
AHRQ HHS K12 HS026395
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

There has been widespread concern over the design of the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) since its authorization with the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015. Using detailed performance data from 2017, the first implementation year of MIPS, we found that although 90 percent of participating clinicians reported performance equal to or better than the low performance threshold of 3 out of 100 (a calculated composite score), almost half of clinicians did not participate in at least one of the three program categories (quality, advancing care information, and improvement activities). The decision to participate in each category explained 86 percent of the total variance in clinicians' overall score, whereas actual performance explained just 14 percent, as a result of the ease of achieving high scores within each category. Still, 74 percent of clinicians who only partially participated in the program received positive payment adjustments. These findings underline concerns that MIPS's design may have been too flexible to effectively incentivize clinicians to make incremental progress across all targeted aspects of the program. In turn, this is likely to lead to resistance when payment penalties become more severe in 2022, as required by the MIPS authorizing legislation.

Indexed as

MedicareMotivationAgedHumansReimbursement, IncentiveUnited StatesFinancial incentivesHealth policyMedicaid servicesMedicareMIPSPaymentPayment modelsPerformance dataPhysician paymentPhysician reportingQuality improvementQuality measurementQuality of careQuality payment program

Identifiers

PMID32897783
PMCPMC7720898

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.