ArticleEnvironment international2020
Biosafety threats of the rapidly established labs for SARS-CoV-2 tests in China.
Article in Environment international, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
7 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 12 citations in OpenAlex.
- Meta-analysis to explain unknown causes of the origins of SARS-COV-2.Environmental research · 2022Pooled it
- The Role of BSL-3 Laboratories in Pandemic Preparedness: A Focus on Brazil's Infrastructure for Biosafety and Disease Control.TheScientificWorldJournal · 2025Review
- Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics.Monash bioethics review · 2024Review
- The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-SARS-CoV-2.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2023Review
- Sources, diffusion and prediction in COVID-19 pandemic: lessons learned to face next health emergency.AIMS public health · 2023Review
- Assessment of COVID-19 Molecular Testing Capacity in Jordan: A Cross-Sectional Study at the Country Level.Diagnostics (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022Article
- COVID-19: Clinical laboratory diagnosis and monitoring of novel coronavirus infected patients using molecular, serological and biochemical markers: A review.International journal of immunopathology and pharmacologyReview
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
5 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
To increase the capacity of identifying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection, many Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) labs have been established in a short period of time for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid tests all over the world. However, their biosafety has not been evaluated, which could have been the first gateway to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. During 9-11 March 2020, the first comprehensive evaluation of the biosafety in all 89 labs qualified for conducting SARS-CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria in five categories was evaluated: biosafety requirements for lab activities (14 criteria), sample transfer, acceptance and management (6 criteria), waste management (9 criteria), personnel training and protection (4 criteria), and lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling (6 criteria). Our results revealed that, although an overall median compliance rate of 94.6% for 39 criteria, only four of 89 labs met all of them. Criteria in personnel training and protection have been most satisfactorily met, followed by lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling. The most severe risk was the lack of automatic doors at the main entrance or in core operation areas, especially among labs in CDC and hospitals. This risk, together with failure for keeping pressure in the core operation areas 25 ± 5 Pa (mainly among labs in the third-party testing agencies), may cause accidental exposure to biological agents from lab activities. Other severe risk included failure for standard labeling of SARS-CoV-2 wastes and lacking regular monitoring of sterilization effects. Our findings would provide experiences and lessons for strengthening lab biosafety in other Chinese provinces, and also serve as an important reference for many other countries where such labs are being or will be quickly built for fighting the COVID-19. The information of lab safety should be considered to be internally linked to the national intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.