Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32768807›Full record

ArticleEnvironment international2020

Biosafety threats of the rapidly established labs for SARS-CoV-2 tests in China.

Dan Yuan, Wenfeng Gao, Shu Liang, Shujuan Yang, Peng Jia

Open access · goldAbstract readLetter
In one paragraph

Article in Environment international, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
0.3field-weighted citation impact, top 32% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 12 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Review
  3. Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics.Monash bioethics review · 2024
    Review
  4. The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-SARS-CoV-2.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2023
    Review
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.

Dan YuanSichuan Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Chengdu, China; International Institute of Spatial Lifecourse Epidemiology (ISLE), Hong Kong, China.
Wenfeng GaoSichuan Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Chengdu, China.
Shu LiangSichuan Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Chengdu, China.
Shujuan YangInternational Institute of Spatial Lifecourse Epidemiology (ISLE), Hong Kong, China; West China School of Public Health and West China Fourth Hospital, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China. Electronic address: rekiny@126.com.
Peng JiaInternational Institute of Spatial Lifecourse Epidemiology (ISLE), Hong Kong, China; Institute for Disaster Management and Reconstruction, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China; Department of Land Surveying and Geo-Informatics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China. Electronic address: jiapengff@hotmail.com.
Sichuan Center for Disease Control and Prevention · CNSichuan University · CN

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

To increase the capacity of identifying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection, many Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) labs have been established in a short period of time for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid tests all over the world. However, their biosafety has not been evaluated, which could have been the first gateway to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. During 9-11 March 2020, the first comprehensive evaluation of the biosafety in all 89 labs qualified for conducting SARS-CoV-2 tests in Sichuan Province of China was conducted. The degree of compliance with 39 criteria in five categories was evaluated: biosafety requirements for lab activities (14 criteria), sample transfer, acceptance and management (6 criteria), waste management (9 criteria), personnel training and protection (4 criteria), and lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling (6 criteria). Our results revealed that, although an overall median compliance rate of 94.6% for 39 criteria, only four of 89 labs met all of them. Criteria in personnel training and protection have been most satisfactorily met, followed by lab environmental disinfection, emergency plans and accident handling. The most severe risk was the lack of automatic doors at the main entrance or in core operation areas, especially among labs in CDC and hospitals. This risk, together with failure for keeping pressure in the core operation areas 25 ± 5 Pa (mainly among labs in the third-party testing agencies), may cause accidental exposure to biological agents from lab activities. Other severe risk included failure for standard labeling of SARS-CoV-2 wastes and lacking regular monitoring of sterilization effects. Our findings would provide experiences and lessons for strengthening lab biosafety in other Chinese provinces, and also serve as an important reference for many other countries where such labs are being or will be quickly built for fighting the COVID-19. The information of lab safety should be considered to be internally linked to the national intelligent syndromic surveillance system (NISSS), for better improving the safety of the labs at the greatest need and facilitating more comprehensive surveillance of risk for disease outbreak.

Indexed as

BetacoronavirusCoronavirus InfectionsCOVID-19Pneumonia, ViralChinaContainment of BiohazardsHumansPandemicsSARS-CoV-2BiosafetyBSL-2COVID-19Environmental riskLab safetyNucleic acid testSARS-CoV-2

Identifiers

PMID32768807
PMCPMC7359782
OpenAlexW3041219065

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.