Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32753599›Full record

ArticleNature communications2020

Evolving cooperation in multichannel games.

Kate Donahue, Oliver P Hauser, Martin A Nowak, Christian Hilbe

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Nature communications, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Cooperation among unequal players with aspiration-driven learning.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Kate DonahueDepartment of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14850, USA. kdonahue@cs.cornell.com.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6482-3952
Oliver P HauserDepartment of Economics, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9282-0801
Martin A NowakDepartment of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.
Christian HilbeMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306, Plön, Germany. hilbe@evolbio.mpg.de.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5116-955X

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Humans routinely engage in many distinct interactions in parallel. Team members collaborate on several concurrent projects, and even whole nations interact with each other across a variety of issues, including trade, climate change and security. Yet the existing theory of direct reciprocity studies isolated repeated games. Such models cannot account for strategic attempts to use the vested interests in one game as a leverage to enforce cooperation in another. Here we introduce a general framework of multichannel games. Individuals interact with each other over multiple channels; each channel is a repeated game. Strategic choices in one channel can affect decisions in another. With analytical equilibrium calculations for the donation game and evolutionary simulations for several other games we show that such linkage facilitates cooperation. Our results suggest that previous studies tend to underestimate the human potential for reciprocity. When several interactions occur in parallel, people often learn to coordinate their behavior across games to maximize cooperation in each of them.

Indexed as

Choice BehaviorCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryModels, PsychologicalComputer SimulationHumansPrisoner Dilemma

Identifiers

PMID32753599
PMCPMC7403149

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.