ArticlePloS one2020
Impact of product subsidies on R&D investment for new energy vehicle firms: Considering quality preference of the early adopter group.
Article in PloS one, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed.
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Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Different consumer groups accept new energy vehicles sequentially from the perspective of innovation diffusion theory, and the early adopter group has recently been identified. By assuming that the density of early adopters is increasing at minimum acceptable quality thresholds, this paper proposes a vertical quality differentiation model of product R&D with product subsidies. The impact of product subsidies on the R&D investment of new energy vehicle firms is discussed. We show that the early adopters' characteristics may affect the stagnant marginal R&D investment of new energy vehicle firms by increasing sales, which determines the impact mechanism of product subsidies. For firms with decreasing marginal R&D investments, insufficient R&D investments result from financial constraints. If insufficient R&D resources deter firms from conducting R&D, substantial unit subsidies invariably incentivize firms to spend their entire R&D budget. Firms with increasing marginal R&D investments, insufficient R&D profits, or financial constraints are prevented from increasing R&D investment. Product subsidies generally have a crowding-in effect on firms not subject to financial constraints, and this effect increases with the unit subsidy. However, the existence of a crowding-in effect may require sufficiently large unit subsidies. In both situations, product subsidies cannot modulate financial constraints if the firm has spent its entire R&D budget. In the first situation, we also show that product subsidies should be replaced by a funding support policy. In contrast, the second situation shows that a funding support policy should be coordinated with product subsidies.
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Registered trials
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