Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32734647›Full record

ArticleHealth economics2020

Moral hazard and selection for voluntary deductibles.

Rob J M Alessie, Viola Angelini, Jochen O Mierau, Laura Viluma

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health economics, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
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  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Rob J M AlessieDepartment of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Viola AngeliniDepartment of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.ORCID 0000-0002-5177-3447
Jochen O MierauDepartment of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Laura VilumaDepartment of Economics, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.ORCID 0000-0003-0699-5777

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the voluntary deductible in the Dutch health insurance system reduces moral hazard or acts only as a cost reduction tool for low-risk individuals. We use a sample of 14,089 observations, comprising 2,939 individuals over seven waves from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences panel for the analysis. We employ bivariate models that jointly model the choice of a deductible and health care utilization and supplement the identification with an instrumental variable strategy. The results show that the voluntary deductible reduces moral hazard, especially in the decision to visit a doctor (extensive margin) compared with the number of visits (intensive margin). In addition, a robustness test shows that selection on moral hazard is not present in this context.

Indexed as

Deductibles and CoinsuranceHealth ExpendituresInsurance, HealthMoralsHumansMaleRiskdeductiblehealth insurancemoral hazardselection

Identifiers

PMID32734647
PMCPMC7539990

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.