Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32692486›Full record

ArticleMolecular systems biology2020

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology.

Benjamin D Trump, S E Galaitsi, Evan Appleton, Diederik A Bleijs, Marie-Valentine Florin, Jimmy D Gollihar, R Alexander Hamilton, Todd Kuiken, Filippa Lentzos, Ruth Mampuys and 7 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Molecular systems biology, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
18citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

18 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Rewilding: history, intervention and the quest for immanence.History and philosophy of the life sciences · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Rethinking governance of synthetic cells.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026
    Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Future trends in synthetic biology in Asia.Advanced genetics (Hoboken, N.J.) · 2021
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Building biosecurity for synthetic biology.Molecular systems biology · 2020
    Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

17 authors.

Benjamin D TrumpUS Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-4097-733X
S E GalaitsiUS Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
Evan AppletonHarvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Diederik A BleijsBiosecurity Office, Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
Marie-Valentine FlorinInternational Risk Governance Center, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Jimmy D GolliharUS Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Adelphi, MD, USA.
R Alexander HamiltonUnited Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Turin, Italy.
Todd KuikenGenetic Engineering & Society Center at North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-7851-6232
Filippa LentzosKing's College London, London, UK.
Ruth MampuysNetherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
Myriam MeradFrench National Centre for Scientific Research, Paris, France.
Tatyana NovossiolovaCenter for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria.
Kenneth OyeInternational Risk Governance Center, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Edward PerkinsUS Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
Natàlia Garcia-ReyeroUS Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.
Catherine RhodesUniversity of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
Igor LinkovUS Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg, MS, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-0823-8107

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.

Indexed as

Industrial DevelopmentPolicy MakingContainment of BiohazardsDNA, RecombinantHumansInternationalityMedicineOrganisms, Genetically ModifiedRisk FactorsSocial SciencesSynthetic BiologyVirulenceDNA, Recombinant

Identifiers

PMID32692486
PMCPMC7373080

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.