Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32655326›Full record

ArticleApplied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association2019

Development of a Biosecurity Checklist for Laboratory Assessment and Monitoring.

Sabrina Brizee, Mark W J van Passel, Linda M van den Berg, Daniel Feakes, Ana Izar, Kathryn Tham Bee Lin, Yuwana Podin, Zalini Yunus, Diederik A Bleijs

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Biosafety and biosecurity challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2023
    Article
  4. Implementation of Bio-Risk Management System in a National Clinical and Medical Referral Centre Laboratories.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2021
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Review
  8. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Sabrina BrizeeNational Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands.
Mark W J van PasselNational Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands.
Linda M van den BergNational Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands.
Daniel FeakesBiological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.
Ana IzarBiological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.
Kathryn Tham Bee LinScience and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), Ministry of Defence Malaysia, Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia.
Yuwana PodinInstitute of Health and Community Medicine, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, Sarawak, Malaysia.
Zalini YunusScience and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), Ministry of Defence Malaysia, Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia.
Diederik A BleijsNational Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

introductionLaboratory biosecurity is of continuously growing interest due to increasing concerns about deliberate misuse of biological materials and emerging biological risks. These risks continue to be magnified by globalization, the rapid pace of scientific development, and dual-use technologies. Worldwide laboratory capacities are expanding, which calls for concrete actions to improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices to protect researchers and the community. Hence, laboratories require comprehensive biorisk management programs to minimize the risk of accidental and deliberate release of infectious biological materials.

objectiveMalaysia has prioritized the concern of national biosecurity and aims to consolidate laboratory biosecurity performance to detect and prevent the deliberate release of biological agents.

methodsTwo 3-day workshops were organized over the course of four months in which Malaysia collaborated with The Netherlands. This bilateral engagement aimed to integrate biosecurity practices in their national biorisk management programs, and resulted into a comprehensive biosecurity checklist for laboratory assessment and monitoring.

resultsThis biosecurity checklist is based on Malaysian and Dutch expert opinions and national and international guidelines and regulations. The biosecurity checklist is a survey-driven tool that consists of a set of concrete questions for each key biosecurity area, which are discussion points for assessment.

conclusionWe display a practical biosecurity checklist for laboratory assessment and monitoring. Although the presented checklist was the template for the specific Malaysia checklist, it could serve as a template for other countries.

Indexed as

biological weapons conventionbiorisk managementchecklistlaboratory biosafetylaboratory biosecurityrisk assessment

Identifiers

PMID32655326
PMCPMC7323818

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.