Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32651773›Full record

ArticleScience and engineering ethics2020

The Boeing 737 MAX: Lessons for Engineering Ethics.

Joseph Herkert, Jason Borenstein, Keith Miller

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Science and engineering ethics, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

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  9. From driverless dilemmas to more practical commonsense tests for automated vehicles.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2021
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Joseph HerkertNorth Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA. jherkert@ncsu.edu.
Jason BorensteinGeorgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Keith MillerUniversity of Missouri - St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The crash of two 737 MAX passenger aircraft in late 2018 and early 2019, and subsequent grounding of the entire fleet of 737 MAX jets, turned a global spotlight on Boeing's practices and culture. Explanations for the crashes include: design flaws within the MAX's new flight control software system designed to prevent stalls; internal pressure to keep pace with Boeing's chief competitor, Airbus; Boeing's lack of transparency about the new software; and the lack of adequate monitoring of Boeing by the FAA, especially during the certification of the MAX and following the first crash. While these and other factors have been the subject of numerous government reports and investigative journalism articles, little to date has been written on the ethical significance of the accidents, in particular the ethical responsibilities of the engineers at Boeing and the FAA involved in designing and certifying the MAX. Lessons learned from this case include the need to strengthen the voice of engineers within large organizations. There is also the need for greater involvement of professional engineering societies in ethics-related activities and for broader focus on moral courage in engineering ethics education.

Indexed as

EngineeringEthics, ProfessionalAircraftMoralsWritingAirline safetyCorporate cultureEngineering designEngineering ethicsRegulationSoftware engineering

Identifiers

PMID32651773
PMCPMC7351545

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.