Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32632925›Full record

ReviewRisk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis2021

Updated Characterization of Post-OPV Cessation Risks: Lessons from 2019 Serotype 2 Outbreaks and Implications for the Probability of OPV Restart.

Dominika A Kalkowska, Mark A Pallansch, Stephen L Cochi, Stephanie D Kovacs, Steven G F Wassilak, Kimberly M Thompson

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
27citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

27 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2024
    Article
  6. Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2024
    Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Modeling scenarios for ending poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2023
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Review
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Review
  19. Article
  20. Potential Future Use, Costs, and Value of Poliovirus Vaccines.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2021
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Dominika A KalkowskaKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA.
Mark A PallanschNational Center for Immunization and Respiratory, Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-1015-4818
Stephen L CochiGlobal Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Stephanie D KovacsGlobal Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Steven G F WassilakGlobal Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Kimberly M ThompsonKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-0849-9147

Funding

CGH CDC HHS U2R GH001913
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

After the globally coordinated cessation of any serotype of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), some risks remain from undetected, existing homotypic OPV-related transmission and/or restarting transmission due to several possible reintroduction risks. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016. Following OPV2 cessation, the GPEI and countries implemented activities to withdraw all the remaining trivalent OPV, which contains all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), from the supply chain and replace it with bivalent OPV (containing only serotypes 1 and 3). However, as of early 2020, monovalent OPV2 use for outbreak response continues in many countries. In addition, outbreaks observed in 2019 demonstrated evidence of different types of risks than previously modeled. We briefly review the 2019 epidemiological experience with serotype 2 live poliovirus outbreaks and propose a new risk for unexpected OPV introduction for inclusion in global modeling of OPV cessation. Using an updated model of global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution with and without consideration of this new risk, we explore the implications of the current global situation with respect to the likely need to restart preventive use of OPV2 in OPV-using countries. Simulation results without this new risk suggest OPV2 restart will likely need to occur (81% of 100 iterations) to manage the polio endgame based on the GPEI performance to date with existing vaccine tools, and with the new risk of unexpected OPV introduction the expected OPV2 restart probability increases to 89%. Contingency planning requires new OPV2 bulk production, including genetically stabilized OPV2 strains.

Indexed as

PoliovirusPoliovirus Vaccine, OralComputer SimulationDisease EradicationDisease OutbreaksGlobal HealthHealth BehaviorHumansPoliomyelitisPoliovirus Vaccine, InactivatedProbabilityRiskRisk ManagementSerogroupVaccinationPoliovirus Vaccine, InactivatedPoliovirus Vaccine, OralDynamic modelingoral poliovirus vaccinepolio eradication

Identifiers

PMID32632925
PMCPMC7814395

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.