Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32610751›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of health policy and management2021

Effects of Activity-Based Hospital Payments in Israel: A Qualitative Evaluation Focusing on the Perspectives of Hospital Managers and Physicians.

Ruth Waitzberg, Wilm Quentin, Elad Daniels, Yael Paldi, Reinhard Busse, Dan Greenberg

Open access · diamondAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in International journal of health policy and management, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
1.5field-weighted citation impact, top 10% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed, 9 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. The Israeli eye care system through a public and global health lens.Israel journal of health policy research · 2025
    Review
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  7. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors at 4 institutions in 3 countries.

Ruth WaitzbergThe Smokler Center for Health Policy Research, Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, Jerusalem, Israel.ORCID 0000-0001-6358-5059
Wilm QuentinDepartment of Health Care Management, Faculty of Economics & Management, Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany.ORCID 0000-0002-1705-6524
Elad DanielsThe Smokler Center for Health Policy Research, Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, Jerusalem, Israel.ORCID 0000-0001-5452-8984
Yael PaldiMaccabi Healthcare Services, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel.
Reinhard BusseDepartment of Health Care Management, Faculty of Economics & Management, Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany.ORCID 0000-0003-4961-9130
Dan GreenbergDepartment of Health Systems Management, School of Public Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel.ORCID 0000-0002-6759-3985
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev · ILEuropean Observatory on Health Systems and Policies · BEMaccabi Healthcare Services · ILMyers-JDC-Brookdale Institute · IL

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundSince 2010, Israel has expanded the adoption of procedure-related group (PRG) based payments for hospitals. While there is a rich quantitative literature that assesses the effects of payment reforms on efficiency or quality of care, very few qualitative studies have focused on the impacts of diagnosis-related group (DRG)-like payments on hospitals from the perspective of hospital workers as change agents.

methodsWe used a qualitative, thematic analysis based on 33 semi-structured in-depth interviews with chief executive officers (CEOs), chief financial officers (CFOs), ward directors and physicians conducted in five public hospitals in Israel, sampled by maximum variation according to hospital characteristics.

resultsInterviewees reported that the payment reform led to organizational changes such as increased transparency and enhanced supervision. Interviewees also reported several actions in response to the economic incentives of PRG-based payment. These included (1) shifting activities to afterhours and using operating rooms (ORs) more efficiently to enable increased surgical volumes; (2) reducing costs by shortening lengths of stay and increasing cost-consciousness in procurement; and (3) increasing revenues by improving coding and selecting procedures. Moderating factors reduced the effects of the reform. For example, organizational factors such as the public nature of hospitals or the (un)availability of healthcare resources did not always allow hospitals to increase the number of cases treated. Also, conflicting incentives such as multiple payment mechanisms or underpricing of procedures blurred the incentives of the reform. Finally, managers and physicians have many other considerations that outweigh the economic ones.

conclusionPRG payments affected the organizational dynamics of hospitals and changed decision-making about admission and treatment policies. However, such effects were moderated by many other factors that should be considered when shaping and analyzing hospital payment reforms.

Indexed as

Hospitals, PublicPhysiciansHealth PersonnelHospitalizationHumansIsraelDiagnosis-Related GroupHealth Policy EvaluationHospital Payment ReformIsrael

Identifiers

PMID32610751
PMCPMC9056186
OpenAlexW3016804920

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.