ArticlePloS one2020
Justified defection is neither justified nor unjustified in indirect reciprocity.
Article in PloS one, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers.
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Who cites it
14 citing papers in PubMed.
- Social norms and group-bounded indirect reciprocity.Evolutionary human sciences · 2026Article
- Exact conditions for evolutionary stability in indirect reciprocity under noise.PLoS computational biology · 2025Article
- Tolerant integrated reciprocity sustains cooperation in a noisy environment.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- Exploring condition in which people accept AI over human judgements on justified defection.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- Article
- Clarifying social norms which have robustness against reputation costs and defector invasion in indirect reciprocity.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Behavioural strategies in simultaneous and alternating prisoner's dilemma games with/without voluntary participation.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Punishment in the public goods game is evaluated negatively irrespective of non-cooperators' motivation.Frontiers in psychology · 2023Article
- Article
- Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure.Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) · 2022Article
- The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Article
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms in the evolution of human cooperation. In indirect reciprocity, social norms with which individuals distinguish good people from bad people play essential roles. Despite extensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in indirect reciprocity, little is known about which social norms people actually adopt. Here we reveal what kind of norms are adopted by people in indirect reciprocal situations in daily life by using scenario-based experiments. The results showed that people evaluated "justified defection" as neither good nor bad and withheld their evaluation. Theoretically, social norms that evaluate justified defection as good are required for cooperation to be stable. However, the norm that people actually adopted deviates from the theoretical predictions. Our results indicate the necessity to reconsider the justification of "justified defection" in the evolution of cooperation.
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