ArticleVaccines2020
Risk Assessment and Virological Monitoring Following an Accidental Exposure to Concentrated Sabin Poliovirus Type 3 in France, November 2018.
Article in Vaccines, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 6 citations in OpenAlex.
- A review of post-exposure strategies for high-consequence viral pathogens in the laboratory.Clinical microbiology reviews · 2025Review
- Implementation of Poliovirus Containment in Poliovirus Designated Facilities-United States, 2017-2024.Pathogens (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025Article
- Establishment of a Poliovirus Containment Program and Containment Certification Process for Poliovirus-Essential Facilities, United States 2017-2022.Pathogens (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Article
- Opening a 60-year time capsule: sequences of historical poliovirus cold variants shed a new light on a contemporary strain.Virus evolution · 2024Article
- Quantitative Risk Assessment of Five Foodborne Viruses in Shellfish Based on Multiplex qPCR.Foods (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
5 authors at 4 institutions in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The safe and secure containment of infectious poliovirus (PV) in facilities where live PV are handled is the condition to achieve and maintain poliomyelitis eradication. Despite precautions to minimize the risk of release of PV from such facilities to the environment, breaches of containment have already been documented. Here, we report the management of an incident that occurred on 30 November 2018 in a French vaccine manufacturing plant. Five adequately vaccinated operators were exposed to a Sabin poliovirus type 3 (PV3) spill. A microbiological risk assessment was conducted and the operators were monitored for PV shedding. On day 5 after exposure, Sabin PV3 was detected only in the stool sample of the most exposed worker. Shedding of Sabin PV3 (as detected by viral culture) was restricted to a very short period (less than 15 days). Monitoring of this incident was an opportunity to assess the relevance of our national response plan. We concluded that the measures undertaken and reported here were appropriate and proportional.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.