Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32559157›Full record

ArticleHealth security

The Cost and Public Health System Effects of Active Monitoring and Illness Response for Ebola Virus Disease: A Case Evaluation of Georgia.

Victoria Phillips, Joseph D Njau, Laura Edison, Clive Brown

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health security. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact, top 95% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 2 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 4 institutions in 2 countries.

Victoria PhillipsVictoria Phillips, DPhil, is an Associate Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, and a consultant to the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, Quarantine and Border Health Services Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.
Joseph D NjauJoseph D. Njau, PhD, is a Staff Fellow, Food and Drug Administration, White Oak Campus Federal Research Center, Silver Spring, MD.
Laura EdisonLaura Edison, DVM, is in the Career Epidemiology Field Officer Program, Division of State and Local Readiness, Center for Preparedness Response; and Clive Brown, MD, is Chief, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, Quarantine and Border Health Services Branch; both at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.
Clive BrownLaura Edison, DVM, is in the Career Epidemiology Field Officer Program, Division of State and Local Readiness, Center for Preparedness Response; and Clive Brown, MD, is Chief, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, Quarantine and Border Health Services Branch; both at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention · USOffice of Readiness and Response · USUnited States Department of Health and Human Services · USUnited States Food and Drug Administration · US

Funding

Intramural CDC HHS CC999999
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In August 2014, the World Health Organization declared the Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa a public health emergency of international concern. After 2 imported cases of the disease were identified in the United States in autumn 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommended that all jurisdictions begin active monitoring of travelers at risk of developing Ebola virus disease for 21 days from the last day of a potential exposure to minimize the risk of disease transmission. Here we describe the infrastructure development, monitoring processes, total planned expenditures, and effects on the public health system in Georgia associated with active monitoring and illness response of all travelers from Ebola-affected West African countries from October 2014 to March 2016. We conducted qualitative interviews with Georgia Department of Public Health (GDPH) staff. We identified state active monitoring and illness response infrastructure investments and monitoring activities and state and federal funds spent in both areas. And, we evaluated whether active monitoring and illness response enhanced Georgia's ability to respond to future infectious disease outbreaks. Developing the infrastructure to support the monitoring and response required investment in information technology, training of public health and medical personnel, increasing laboratory capacity, and securing personal protective equipment. Estimated total expenditures were $8.25 million, with 76% spent on infrastructure and 17% on daily monitoring. The GDPH leveraged internal resources and partnerships to implement active monitoring and illness response. Infrastructure investment increased surveillance capacity, strengthened relationships between the GDPH and medical providers, and led to the creation of infectious disease transport and hospital networks. Active monitoring and illness response increased outbreak preparedness, but it warrants comparison with other possible responses to determine its overall value.

Indexed as

Civil DefenseHemorrhagic Fever, EbolaPopulation SurveillanceDisease OutbreaksGeorgiaHumansInterviews as TopicPublic HealthUnited StatesCostsEbola virus diseaseEpidemic management/responsePublic health preparedness/response

Identifiers

PMID32559157
PMCPMC11151352
OpenAlexW3036844553

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceTDM
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.