Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32493382›Full record

ArticleBMC health services research2020

Control of unreasonable growth of medical expenses in public hospitals in Shanghai, China: a multi-agent system model.

Wenya Yu, Xiang Liu, Fangjie Zhao, Meina Li, Lulu Zhang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC health services research, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

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0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

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3 · Its place in the literature

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4 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Wenya YuSchool of Public Health, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, 200025, China.
Xiang LiuDepartment of Respiratory Disease, The 903rd Hospital of PLA, Hangzhou, 310000, Zhejiang, China.
Fangjie ZhaoDepartment of Military Health Service Management, College of Military Health Service Management, Second Military Medical University, Shanghai, 200433, China.
Meina LiDepartment of Military Health Service Management, College of Military Health Service Management, Second Military Medical University, Shanghai, 200433, China. meinali53@sina.cn.
Lulu ZhangDepartment of Military Health Service Management, College of Military Health Service Management, Second Military Medical University, Shanghai, 200433, China. zllrmit@163.com.

Funding

Joint Research Project of Major Disease of Shanghai Health System 2013ZYJB0006Major Project in the '12th Five-Year Plan' of the People's Liberation Army AWS12J002National Natural Science Foundation of China 71233008National Natural Science Foundation of China 71303248National Natural Science Foundation of China 71673291National Natural Science Foundation of China 71774167Shanghai Pujiang Program 19PJC112
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThis study aims to establish a multi-agent system model to provide accurate suggestions for the policy proposal of controlling the unreasonable growth of medical expenses charged by public hospitals in China.

methodsA multi-agent system model was employed in this study. Agents of this model were divided into patients, doctors, medical institutions, the government, and medical insurance agencies. The model was composed of two subsystems: the disease and medical-seeking subsystem, and the medical expenses subsystem. Policy intervention experiments were conducted on patients' medical-seeking preferences, doctors' public welfare behaviors, and the government's financial investment.

resultsAt present, medical expenses in China are unreasonable and keep increasing, and the proportion of medicine and physical examination expenses to total medical expenses for public hospitals is unreasonable. Intervention experiments suggested that expanding the promotion and application of the community first-visit system could rationalize patients' medical-seeking preferences, increasing doctors' incomes and reducing workload could significantly restrict doctors' over-prescription behaviors. Also, improving the government's financial investment could guide public hospitals to strengthen their commitment to public welfare responsibilities. These interventions could decrease the unreasonable growth of medical expenses of public hospitals. The combined intervention effects on suppliers, demanders, and the government were better than the effect of these agents independently.

conclusionsThe main reasons for the unreasonable increase in patient medical expenses at public hospitals could be attributed to patients' unreasonable medical-seeking preferences, doctors' weak public welfare incentives, and the government's inadequate financial investment. Policy-makers should consider proposals to restrict and guide the behaviors of suppliers, demanders, and the government, simultaneously. The government should consider the feasibility, response speed, and implementation cost of policies as well.

Indexed as

ChinaCost ControlHealth Care ReformHealth ExpendituresHealth PolicyHospitals, PublicHumansModels, OrganizationalChinaHealthcare reformHealth policyModelMulti-agent systemPublic hospitalShanghai

Identifiers

PMID32493382
PMCPMC7268700

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.