Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32470089›Full record

Trial reportPloS one2020

A pilot randomized trial of incentive strategies to promote HIV retesting in rural Uganda.

Gabriel Chamie, Alex Ndyabakira, Kara G Marson, Devy M Emperador, Moses R Kamya, Diane V Havlir, Dalsone Kwarisiima, Harsha Thirumurthy

Registry-linked trialAbstract readRandomized Controlled Trial
In one paragraph

Trial report in PloS one, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT02890459 (Innovative Incentive Strategies for Sustainable HIV Testing and Antiretroviral Treatment), which is not on this map. Cited by 11 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

NCT02890459 nacompletednot on this map

Innovative Incentive Strategies for Sustainable HIV Testing and Antiretroviral Treatment

TypeinterventionalSponsorUniversity of California, San FranciscoRan2016 to 2020Enrolled3,580ConditionsHIV/AIDSArmsPrize incentive - Low, Prize incentive - High, Escalating payment incentive, Travel Voucher, Standard care
3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
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  3. Trial
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  11. Controlling COVID-19 Outbreaks with Financial Incentives.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2021
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

8 authors.

Gabriel ChamieUniversity of California, San Francisco, California, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-5860-8081
Alex NdyabakiraInfectious Diseases Research Collaboration, Mbarara, Uganda.
Kara G MarsonUniversity of California, San Francisco, California, United States of America.
Devy M EmperadorUniversity of California, San Francisco, California, United States of America.
Moses R KamyaMakerere University College of Health Sciences, Kampala, Uganda.
Diane V HavlirUniversity of California, San Francisco, California, United States of America.
Dalsone KwarisiimaMakerere University Joint AIDS Program, Kampala, Uganda.
Harsha ThirumurthyUniversity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America.

Funding

Innovative incentive strategies for sustainable HIV testing and linkage to careR01MH105254 · NIMH · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI CHAMIE, GABRIEL, THIRUMURTHY, HARSHA · 2015 to 2019
$3.0M
NIMH NIH HHS R01 MH105254
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundRetesting for HIV is critical to identifying newly-infected persons and reinforcing prevention efforts among at-risk adults. Incentives can increase one-time HIV testing, but their role in promoting retesting is unknown. We sought to test feasibility and acceptability of incentive strategies, including commitment contracts, to promote HIV retesting among at-risk adults in rural Uganda.

methodsAt-risk HIV-negative adults were enrolled in a pilot trial assessing feasibility and acceptability of incentive strategies to promote HIV retesting three months after enrollment. Participants were randomized (1:1:3) to: 1) no incentive; 2) standard cash incentive (~US$4); and 3) commitment contract: participants could voluntarily make a low- or high-value deposit that would be returned with added interest (totaling ~US$4 including the deposit) upon retesting or lost if participants failed to retest. Contracts sought to promote retesting by leveraging loss aversion and addressing present bias via pre-commitment. Outcomes included acceptability of trial enrollment, contract feasibility (proportion of participants making deposits), and HIV retesting uptake.

resultsOf 130 HIV-negative eligible adults, 123 (95%) enrolled and were randomized: 74 (60%) to commitment contracts, 25 (20%) to standard incentives, and 24 (20%) to no incentive. Of contract participants, 69 (93%) made deposits. Overall, 93 (76%) participants retested for HIV: uptake was highest in the standard incentive group (22/25 [88%]) and lowest in high-value contract (26/36 [72%]) and no incentive (17/24 [71%]) groups.

conclusionIn a randomized trial of strategies to promote HIV retesting among at-risk adults in Uganda, incentive strategies, including commitment contracts, were feasible and had high acceptability. Our findings suggest use of incentives for HIV retesting merits further comparison in a larger trial.

trial registrationClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT:02890459.

Indexed as

Mass ScreeningAdultFemaleHIV InfectionsHumansMaleMotivationPilot ProjectsRisk FactorsRural PopulationUganda

Identifiers

PMID32470089
PMCPMC7259772

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.