Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32431365›Full record

ArticleThe journal of political economy2020

Subsidy Design in Privately Provided Social Insurance: Lessons from Medicare Part D.

Francesco Decarolis, Maria Polyakova, Stephen P Ryan

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The journal of political economy, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Francesco DecarolisUniversita Bocconi and IGIER.
Maria PolyakovaStanford University, CESifo, and NBER.
Stephen P RyanWashington University in St. Louis, CESifo, and NBER.

Funding

Understanding and Improving Healthcare Decision-Making and Outcomes for People Living with Alzheimer's Disease and Related DementiasP01AG005842 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI KOSALI ILAYPERUMA SIMON · 1986 to 2026
$56.5M
NIA NIH HHS P01 AG005842
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The efficiency of publicly-subsidized, privately-provisioned social insurance programs depends on the interaction between strategic insurers and the subsidy mechanism. We study this interaction in the context of Medicare's prescription drug coverage program. We find that the observed mechanism is successful in keeping "raise-the-subsidy" incentives relatively low, acts much like a flat voucher, and obtains a level of welfare close to the optimal voucher. Across a range of counterfactuals, we find that more efficient subsidy mechanisms share three features: they retain the marginal elasticity of demand, limit the exercise of market power, and preserve the link between prices and marginal costs.

Indexed as

D44H57Health InsuranceI11I18L22MedicarePart DPrescription DrugsPrivate ProvisionRegulationSubsidy Design

Identifiers

PMID32431365
PMCPMC7236560

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.